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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
 
 
 
NEW INPUT AND OUTPUT RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCERS 
 
 Backgounding beef cattle is an inherently risky venture.  Producers face 
production risks as well as marketing risks.  If a backgrounding operation is to be viable, 
these risks should be addressed and effectively managed.  While some effective risk 
management tools are currently available to livestock producers, some other potentially 
useful risk management tools, for various reasons, have been previously unavailable.  
Two such tools which could help livestock producers achieve the overall goal of 
managing net income risk are a program for managing feed ingredient nutrient and price 
variability in the selection of minimum cost feed rations and government subsidized 
livestock price insurance. 
Due to lack of data and limited computational power of solvers, risk has seldom 
been introduced into the feed ration selection process.  Presently, both feed ingredient 
nutritional data and appropriate solvers are available, allowing for risk to be fully 
considered in this decision-making process.  Only recently has there been policy efforts 
to establish subsidized price or revenue insurance for livestock producers.  The 
introduction of such insurance to livestock producers offers potential risk management 
benefit but also has the potential to introduce improper incentives to livestock producers. 
This study will evaluate both of the aforementioned livestock risk management 
tools.  In addition to evaluating their effectiveness, the policy concerns of subsidized 
livestock insurance will also be addressed.  Results will be relevant to a broad range of 
entities.  In addition to livestock producers wishing to manage the risks associated with 
their operations, agribusinesses that provide service to these producers such as feed sales 
or financial lending will benefit from knowing how these risk management strategies 
perform.  Furthermore, policy makers who will structure livestock insurance products can 
hopefully do so more efficiently based on the results of the livestock insurance analysis. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Beef production continues to be a major component of United States agriculture.  
According the 1997 Census of Agriculture, market value of all cattle and calves1 
produced comprised slightly more than 20% of the total market value of all United States 
agricultural production.  Fed cattle (referred to as fattened cattle in 1997 census reports), 
or beef cattle fed specifically for slaughter, comprised about 10% of this total.  Given this 
level of contribution to the national agricultural economy, it is worthwhile to focus some 
agricultural economic analysis on beef production.  One broad objective of such analysis 
should be searching for ways to improve the viability and profitability of beef operations. 
As with all types of agriculture, ability to manage the risk associated with a beef 
operation is paramount to the success of that operation.  Unlike pork and poultry 
production, beef production has seen relatively little effort at vertical coordination 
through non-price means and thus cannot enjoy the risk sharing opportunities these 
provide.  Beef producers, in general, focus on a specific phase of production (e.g. cow-
calf production or cattle feeding) and must take full responsibility for managing the risks 
associated with that particular type of operation.  Given this situation, two important roles 
of livestock economists are the evaluation of existing risk management strategies for beef 
producers and the identification and evaluation of novel risk management strategies.  
This study will focus on the latter by introducing and evaluating two novel
                                                                 
1 The census category of cattle and calves will encompass beef cattle and calves sold as well as those sold 
for dairy or other purposes. 
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livestock risk management strategies.  The analyses of this study will apply these 
strategies to beef production operations but the general framework for the strategies as 
well as conclusions from the evaluations should apply to a broader group of livestock 
producers. 
 Before introducing these strategies, it will be beneficial to first provide basic 
background information on beef production, followed by a brief overview of current risk 
management strategies available to beef producers.  Then a review of selected risk 
literature will be used to establish the theoretical and methodological framework needed 
to evaluate the risk management strategies.  After the strategies are introduced and 
evaluated, conclusions regarding this evaluation will be presented. 
 
Beef Backgrounding 
Beef cattle production takes place at three basic levels: cow-calf production, 
backgrounding, and finishing.  Cow-calf producers own breeding stock and produce beef 
calves.  These calves are usually weaned at about 400 to 600 pounds, depending upon 
breed effects and in which region of the United States they are raised.  At this point the 
calves may be sent directly to the feedlot or they may enter a backgrounding program.  
Calves in a backgrounding program are fed until they reach weights of about 750 pounds.  
This weight gain can be accomplished through grazing programs (e.g., grazing cool 
season pasture in the southeastern U.S. or grazing winter wheat in the southern plains), 
feeding programs that rely on harvested forages and feed concentrates, or some 
combination thereof.  At this weight the cattle are known as feeder cattle and are 
generally shipped to a feedlot where they enter intensive feeding programs until they 
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reach slaughter weight.  There are risks and production conditions that are unique to each 
stage of production.  Given these differences, it is often beneficial to focus livestock 
studies on a specific level of production.  Backgrounding as defined above is a very 
common practice in the southeastern United States.  This study will focus on the risks 
associated with these types of backgrounding opertations. 
 The profitability of backgrouding operations is influenced by risk from several 
different sources including production and marketing risk.  Mortality and morbidity (i.e., 
reduced physical response due to illness) are two of the most common production risks 
that affect animal performance.  These are often attributable, at least in some degree, to 
weather and environmental conditions, which can also influence performance directly.  
Another form of backgrounding production risk is uncertain feed ingredient composition.  
Specifically, if feedstuffs do not contain the expected amount of nutrients, animals will 
not achieve expected levels of weight gain.  In addition to production risk, backgrounders 
face marketing risk.  This is true of both inputs and outputs.  Since feed and weaned 
calves are the two major inputs for a backgrounding operation, any fluctuation in their 
prices can drastically affect profitability.  Backgrounders must purchase these inputs 
months in advance of the sale of feeder cattle.  Therefore, volatility of feeder cattle 
(output) prices is also vital to backgrounders’ profitability. 
This study will focus on the marketing risk associated with backgrounding and the 
production risk of uncertain feed composition.  Specifically this study will examine novel 
risk management strategies for price and composition risks associated with purchasing 
feed ingredients and marketing risk of selling feeder cattle.  Before introducing these 
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strategies a brief explanation of commonly used strategies for managing input and output 
risks will be presented. 
 
Current Livestock Risk Management 
Producers wishing to manage marketing risk often utilize futures markets to do 
so.  Many of the feed ingredients purchased by backgrounders have corresponding 
futures contracts that are traded on futures exchanges.  Producers can hedge the purchase 
of these inputs to attempt to “lock in” a price subject to basis risk or they can purchase 
call options to establish a price ceiling for the ingredients.  For feedstuffs such as grain 
by-products (which represent an important feed resource for many commercial 
backgrounding operations) there are no exact futures contracts.  Producers can possibly 
hedge these using a closely related futures contract (Anderson and Danthine).  However, 
this procedure, known as cross hedging, can be quite complicated.  A more common 
approach, which is also used for traditional ingredients, is forward contracting.  A 
producer can contract the purchase of feedstuffs in advance of the actual purchase 
thereby reducing price risk of the feed inputs. 
 Feeder cattle price risk can be managed using the same mechanisms.  The 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange trades a feeder cattle futures contract.  Just as with feed 
ingredients, producers may choose to hedge or cross hedge the sale of feeder cattle using 
this contract.  Producers can also establish a price floor by purchasing a put option.  If 
prices are favorable, it may be beneficial to contract the sale of feeder cattle in advance.  
As with inputs, forward contracting establishes a price in advance and reduces marketing 
risk of the output. 
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 Another form of input risk that has received considerably less attention in risk 
management studies is input composition uncertainty.  In the context of livestock 
production this is variability of nutrients in a given feed ingredient.  Generally producers 
assume that nutrient levels are constant in feed ingredients from one purchase to the next.  
If, in reality, nutrient levels are lower than assumed, the nutritional requirements of the 
animals may not be met and therefore there will be fewer pounds of feeder cattle to sell at 
the end of a feeding period.  This form of risk to livestock operations has been 
documented in animal science literature and briefly addressed in economic studies.  
However, it has yet to be modeled explicitly.  Furthermore, it has yet to be incorporated 
into risk management strategies for livestock producers. 
While livestock producers have alternatives for managing both input and output 
risk, it is worthwhile to continue to seek out and evaluate new alternatives.  This study 
does just that.  Risk management tools that have been, for all practical purposes, 
previously unavailable to producers are introduced and evaluated.  These risk 
management strategies are discussed in the following section. 
 
Novel Risk Management Tools 
Managing Input Risk 
Producers can choose a minimum cost combination of feed ingredients that satisfy 
the nutritional requirements of the animals from available feed ingredients using 
mathematical programming.  This is a common approach in both academic research and 
applied decision tools.  However, it is also possible to use this selection process to 
manage both the price and composition risk associated with feed ingredients.  This risk 
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management strategy has gone largely ignored in agricultural economic research.  
Chapter III will specify and evaluate such a strategy by expanding the basic minimum 
cost feed ration model to consider both feed ingredient price and composition risk. 
 
Managing Output Risk 
Recent legislation has cleared the way for government subsidized livestock 
insurance.  The Risk Management Agency of the USDA is currently evaluating livestock 
insurance products to be used in pilot programs around the country.  These products will 
likely be sold by private firms in a form similar to European put options with premiums 
being subsidized by the government.  The introduction of new risk management tool such 
as this could have major implications for beef production.  Chapter IV of this study will 
simulate the effects of subsidized insurance on expected feeder cattle prices.  The risk 
management ability of this insurance will then be evaluated.  This chapter will also 
examine the policy implications of subsidized livestock insurance and form hypotheses of 
the potential effects on beef production of such a program. 
 
Study Objectives and Contributions 
The general objective of this study is to introduce and evaluate novel risk 
management strategies for livestock producers.  Specifically, two novel strategies will be 
evaluated.  These are the consideration of risk in the selection of feed rations and 
government subsidized livestock insurance. 
Chapter III introduces the consideration of feed ingredient price and nutrient risk 
into the feed ration selection process.  This expanded model will be an improvement over 
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previous ration selection models and decision aids that have largely ignored nutrient and 
price variability of feed ingredients.  Economic studies have shown that these risks do 
influence variability of total feed cost and animal performance and therefore net income 
(e.g., Prevatt et al. highlight feedstuff price variability; Thomas et al. examine feedstuff 
nutrient variability).  In addition to economic studies, recent animal science and nutrition 
studies have focused on nutrient variability in feedstuffs (Cromwell et al., DePeters et 
al.).  The presence of these issues in such scientific studies justifies their being modeled 
explicitly in the context of an optimal feed ration selection process. 
Recent feedstuff data availability and improvements in the computational power 
of optimization software makes the specification and modeling of an expanded model 
possible.  Such a model will give producers the opportunity to manage risks associated 
with selecting a feed ration.  In addition to providing information on the effectiveness of 
this risk management strategy, Chapter III will make both academic and applied 
contributions.  The study will serve as one of the few examples of modeling technical 
coefficient risk utilizing Merrill’s approach.  Merrill developed this modeling technique 
nearly forty years ago but due to limitations of computational solvers it has gone virtually 
unused.  The model presented in Chapter III will also serve as one of the only examples 
of a feed ration selection model that considers both price and nutrient risk involved in the 
feed ration process.  This model should serve as a basis for more advanced decision tools 
for producers wishing to manage these risks.   
Chapter IV evaluates the effectiveness of subsidized livestock price insurance 
compared to European put options.  This chapter highlights the adoption of both 
European options and subsidized insurance over a wide range of risk attitudes.  This 
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allows for effectiveness of these alternatives as risk management tools to be evaluated.  
Furthermore, willingness to pay for unsubsidized and subsidized risk management 
programs will be calculated.  This information coupled with economic theory provides 
the basis needed to form hypotheses concerning the effects of subsidized livestock 
insurance.  Specifically, the hypotheses will focus on unintentional effects of these 
programs on beef production.  The formation and presentation of these hypotheses will 
make the results of the study relevant to a wide range of individuals. 
In a broad sense, Chapter IV will serve as an example of the effects of risk on 
agricultural decision making.  Specifically, the results will be of interest to livestock 
producers, who will soon need to evaluate the usefulness of similar insurance products to 
their respective operations.  Such producers can look to these results for an example of 
how these products may affect their operations.  The results from Chapter IV will also be 
of interest to policy makers who will soon be called upon to construct livestock insurance 
products.  The hypotheses offered in Chapter IV should serve to highlight the concerns 
and possible dangers of constructing such risk management programs. 
 
Organization of the Study 
This study is structured around two central articles (Chapters III and IV).  This 
may differ from previous theses or dissertations encountered by the reader and therefore a 
brief description of the organization of the study is warranted.  Both Chapters III and IV 
are stand alone articles and can be reviewed independently of each other and all other 
portions of this thesis.  However, the two articles are related by overlapping objectives, 
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methodologies, and subject matter.  Given these overlaps, there is some benefit to 
presenting the two articles as parts of a larger livestock risk management study. 
An introduction to this study has been presented in the preceding sections of this 
chapter.  The review of selected literature in the following section describes related 
previous research and lays the foundations for the methodologies used Chapters III and 
IV.  Much of the information in Chapters I and II will be repeated with more or less detail 
within Chapters III and IV.  This is a necessary condition if both Chapters III and IV are 
to be stand-alone articles.  This repetition should not detract from the study but rather will 
serve to reinforce those concepts that are core to the study.  There will be similar 
repetition in Chapter V where a brief summary of the study will be presented.  
Conclusions from the study will follow this summary. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF SELECTED RISK LITERATURE 
 
 
 As outlined in the previous chapter, backgrounding beef cattle is a risky venture.  
Backgrounders face production and marketing risk.  While production risks and their 
effects on animal performance can be controlled to some extent by sound management 
practices, they can by no means be eliminated.  There are also a considerable number of 
agricultural economic studies that refer to the riskiness of feeder cattle prices (e.g., 
Johnson, Spreen, and Hewitt; Harrison et al.).  Given this situation, examination of risk 
management and decision-making criteria for backgrounders is warranted.  This chapter, 
will present a review of some widely accepted methods of examining risky decision 
making that can be applied to virtually any situation wherein a decision maker must 
choose between alternatives with risky outcomes.  The following two chapters of this 
study will then apply some of these methods to the specific case of a beef backgrounder. 
 
Choice Under Uncertainty 
 One of the most widely researched areas in economics is how individuals make 
decisions and evaluate available alternatives.  This analysis is made much more 
interesting, realistic and complex when risk surrounding the alternatives is considered.  In 
this section, a brief history of risky decision making will be presented.  The generally 
accepted decision-making model of maximizing expected utility will be outlined along 
with some of its strengths and limitations.  After this, alternative decision-making criteria 
will be given a more thorough review to establish the relevance of their use in the 
economic analyses of the following two chapters. 
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Expected Utility Framework 
 Nearly three hundred years ago Bernoulli proposed that individuals do not base 
risky decisions solely on the expected value of outcomes but rather on the utility 
(Bernoulli used the term “moral value”) that they expect to receive from the outcomes.  
Since this time, economists, mathematicians and scientists from many other disciplines 
have endeavored to fully define the decision-making process when outcomes are 
uncertain.  von Neuman and Morgenstern offer what is perhaps the most widely accepted 
model for choice facing uncertainty in their expected utility hypothesis. 
 Under the expected utility hypothesis, von Neuman and Morgenstern begin by 
stating that utility maximization is a rational goal when a decision maker is faced with 
risky choices.  In this framework, an individual will evaluate the expected value and 
probability of occurrence of each alternative.  This evaluation is carried out by first 
entering the probabilities and expected outcomes into an individual’s utility function.  It 
is then a matter of selecting the combination of available alternatives that maximizes the 
function.  The manner in which individuals choose among available alternatives is then 
dependent upon their utility function, which reflects attitude toward risk. 
 
Attitude Toward Risk 
 Some individuals, known as risk preferring or risk seeking, will seek out risky 
situations in hopes of realizing large payoffs at times.  Others will only consider the 
expected values and give no consideration to the risk surrounding them.  These 
individuals are commonly referred to as being risk neutral.  A third possibility, and some 
would say the most common case, is an individual who avoids risk.  This class of risk 
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averse decision makers actually maximize utility by reducing the variability surrounding 
the expected value of an outcome.  Risk aversion has been the subject of many economic 
studies and can actually be quantified and used to show how much an individual is 
willing to pay to manage the risk associated with available choices.  A classic example of 
this is calculating a risk premium or the amount an individual is willing to pay to avoid 
risk in a given situation. 
 Risk averse decision makers will seek to manage the risk associated with their 
alternatives.  Risk averse individuals, in many cases, are willing to forgo some amount of 
expected income (a risk premium) to avoid entering into a risky situation (Arrow, Pratt).  
This risk attitude is the fundamental basis for risk sharing instruments such as insurance.  
If a decision maker’s utility function is known, the risk premium that he or she will pay to 
avoid a risky situation can be quantified and used to arrive at willingness to pay for 
insurance (Pratt). 
While both expected utility hypothesis and Pratt’s method for calculating risk 
aversion are theoretically sound, each assumes that the utility function of the decision 
maker is known and specified.  It is possible to specify utility functions using a properly 
designed set of interview questions (Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker) and there are 
several economic analyses that use this approach (e.g., Officer and Halter; Lin, Dean, and 
Moore).  While results from some studies have been promising, there are many factors 
ranging from type of questions asked (Roumasset, Young) to assumptions regarding 
functional forms (Lin and Chang) that can bias the specification of utility functions.  
Furthermore, even if properly implemented, eliciting utility functions is time consuming 
and arduous.  In response to these limitations of the expected utility hypothesis, 
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alternative decision-making criteria have been developed that do not require that utility 
functions be known.  This study will rely on such methodologies in the interest of 
circumventing the problems associated with specifying decision makers’ utility functions. 
 
Decision-Making Tools When Utility Functions are Unknown 
 It is neither practical nor, in some cases, even possible to specify a decision 
maker’s utility function.  Therefore applied economic decision-making analysis must 
often rely on alternative procedures of ranking risky alternatives.  In general these 
approaches are designed to present a risk efficient set of choices, which is a subset of all 
available choices, and allow decision makers to choose from them.  Any alternative not in 
the risk efficient set is said to be risk dominated and should not be considered by the 
decision maker.  Two widely used techniques that follow this general framework are 
expected value variance (E-V) analysis and stochastic dominance criteria. 
 
Expected Value Variance Analysis 
 Intrigued by the manner in which investors choose stocks in which to invest, 
Markowitz sought to explain how individuals choose an optimal investment mix from 
available risky stocks.  Confronted with the problems mentioned earlier associated with 
specifying utility functions, Markowitz developed a procedure that requires only a 
measure of risk aversion to simulate utility maximizing decisions.  Freund made similar 
contributions, apparently independent of Markowitz, to the development of a technique 
known as expected value variance (E-V) analysis. 
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E-V is widely used in agricultural economic research to model risky decision 
making.  There has been some debate, however, as to whether E-V results are consistent 
with expected utility hypothesis results.  It is now generally agreed upon that E-V 
analysis is consistent with expected utility theory in three cases:  (1) the underlying 
income distribution is normal (Freund), (2) the distributions of the decision variable 
differ only by location and scale (Meyer, 1987), and (3) the underlying utility function is 
quadratic (Markowitz, Tobin).  Given its presence in many economic studies and 
empirical evidence that demonstrates its closeness to expected utility maximizing choices 
(Levy and Markowitz), E-V analysis is a useful tool for evaluating risky decisions. 
In addition to being used in optimization procedures such as Markowitz’s 
investment problem (use of E-V in optimization will be addressed in detail in a following 
section), E-V can be used as a means of simply ranking mutually exclusive, available 
risky alternatives (Robison and Barry; Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).  The E-V 
framework calculates the risk-adjusted returns or certainty equivalent (CE) for each 
alternative.  The CE is the expected value of an alternative minus the variance 
surrounding the expected value times a risk aversion parameter.  The CE of each 
alternative can be used to rank the alternatives (Robison and Barry). 
 
Stochastic Dominance Criteria 
Unlike E-V analysis, which is based solely on the first two moments of a 
distribution, stochastic dominance (SD) criteria consider the entire distribution and 
therefore are generally more robust analytical tools. This is because SD places fewer 
restrictions on the utility function of the decision maker and bases risk dominance on the 
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entire cumulative distribution function (CDF) of each alternative.  Three types of 
stochastic dominance are used to rank risky choices.  These are first degree stochastic 
dominance (FSD), second degree stochastic dominance (SSD), and stochastic dominance 
with respect to a function or generalized stochastic dominance (SDRF). 
 The least restrictive form of SD is FSD and only imposes the restriction that a 
decision maker prefers more to less.  Consider the CDF’s of two income (y) generating 
alternatives, A and B, represented by A(y) and B(y), respectively.  Alternative A 
dominates B in the sense of FSD if for all values of y A(y)  £ B(y) with at least one strict 
inequality.  In other words, the CDF of A lies to the right of the CDF of B indicating that 
for any given probability a higher income level is associated with A than with B 
(Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).  FSD does have limitations.  If the CDF’s of available 
alternatives cross then there is no dominance in the sense of FSD.  This occurrence is 
common when evaluating several similar decisions.  So when faced with many 
alternatives FSD is not likely to eliminate a large portion of them, thereby leaving the 
decision maker with a large number of alternatives still in the efficient set (Robison and 
Barry).  To gain more discriminatory power, it is necessary to add more restrictions to 
FSD. 
 SSD assumes not only that more is preferred to less but that decision makers are 
risk averse for all values of y.  This allows CDF’s that cross to be evaluated in many 
cases.  Using the same notation as in the FSD example, A dominates B in the sense of 
SSD if 
 [ ] 0 dy  B(y) - A(y)
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for all values of y with at least one strict inequality (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).  
Put into words, SSD compares the areas between the two CDF’s.  If the area between 
A(y) and B(y) where A(y) £ B(y) (Area X) is greater than the area between A(y) and 
B(y) where B(y) £ A(y) (Area Y) then A is dominant to B in the sense of SDD.  
However, if Areas X and Y are equal or if Area Y > Area X then SSD cannot discern 
between the two.  Given this limitation of discriminatory power and the assumptions 
already in place it is very useful to have more robust SD criteria. 
Meyer 1977 specifies SDRF, which is a more discriminatory and flexible test for 
risk dominance.  SDRF is the most discriminatory of the SD criteria (Robison and Barry; 
Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).  Also, FSD and SSD can be shown to be special cases 
of SDRF (see Meyer for explanation).  These characteristics of SDRF make it the most 
robust and useful tool for risk analysis. 
SDRF attempts to introduce the advantages of knowing decision makers 
preferences without eliciting utility functions.  This is accomplished by relying on the 
specification of upper (FU) and lower (FL) bounds of the Pratt risk aversion coefficient, 
which is often easier to estimate than a utility function (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).  
Assuming an individual has a utility function U(y), then the Pratt coefficient is equal to 
(2.1) 
 
Once L and U have been specified then a U(y) that minimizes 
(2.2) 
is found.  If the expression is positive then A is preferred to B.  If the expression is 
zero, SDRF cannot rank the two alternatives.  If the expression is negative, B might be 
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preferred to A.  To verify this A(y) – B(y) is substituted into the brackets and the 
expression is reevaluated.  If the minimum of the new expression is positive then B is 
definitely preferred to A.  If the expression is again negative, SDRF cannot rank the 
alternatives. 
 Since SDRF is such a robust and powerful SD criteria, decision tools that utilize 
this approach have been developed.  One such tool is the software developed by Raskin 
and Cochran, of which a thorough explanation is given by Goh et al.  This software has 
been used in numerous agricultural economic risk analyses.  For example Williams et al. 
use the program to evaluate crop insurance policies while Harrison et al. use it to rank 
feeder cattle marketing strategies. 
 
Calculating Risk Preferences 
Both E-V and SDRF require that risk aversion parameters be numerically 
specified.  Once again the issue of the decision maker’s utility function being unknown 
becomes relevant.  Much the same as the decision-making criteria reviewed earlier, 
methods for calculating risk aversion parameters when utility functions are unknown 
have been developed.  McCarl and Bessler offer such a method for estimating the upper 
bound of the Pratt risk aversion coefficient. 
McCarl and Bessler propose a formulation in which the decision maker is said to 
maximize the lower limit of a confidence interval from a normally distributed set of 
returns.  The formula is 
(2.3)    
y
 
S
2Z a=F  
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where F= risk aversion parameter, Za= the standardized normal one-tailed Z value of an 
a level of significance, and yS  is the relevant standard deviation under risk neutral 
returns.  In this formulation, Za = 50% is considered to be risk neutral while Za greater 
than 50% is risk averse and Za less than 50% is risk preferring.  This technique of 
estimating the Pratt risk aversion coefficient is applicable to E-V and SDRF analysis, as 
well as any procedure where a measure of risk aversion is required. 
 
Risk in Mathematical Programming Models 
While ranking available alternative choices is useful in decision analysis it is 
often beneficial to identify optimal combinations of alternatives.2  Mathematical 
programming has been used extensively, especially in farm management and production 
economic studies, to do just that (e.g., Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker; Beneke and 
Winterboer).  Linear programming, a specific form of mathematical programming, is 
commonly used to model decision making as a constrained optimization.  A limitation of 
basic linear programming models is the absence of risk or uncertainty from the modeling. 
There are techniques available that introduce risk into the optimization procedure.  
Some of these techniques require nonlinear specification of either the objective function 
or constraints and thus have only become feasible as the computational power of solvers 
has increased.  A description of introducing risk into mathematical programming models 
follows with more explanation being given to those techniques utilized in this study. 
 
                                                                 
2 Convex stochastic dominance (CSD) as developed by Fishburn can also be used to arrive at linear 
combinations of alternatives.  As it is not utilized in this study, CSD was not explained in detail. 
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Objective Function Risk 
 Many mathematical programming models, such as Markowitz’s portfolio 
selection model, must choose an optimal combination of alternatives from a group of 
available, risky alternatives.  If only the expected value or mean return of each alternative 
is used to make this selection, the variability surrounding the expected value is ignored 
and the variability of the objective function value is also ignored.  As Bernoulli 
hypothesized long ago and Markowitz observed in the stock market, decision makers do 
not make decisions solely on this expected value.  One method of introducing the concept 
of objective function risk into mathematical programming models is an E-V framework. 
 E-V analysis (Markowitz, Freund), described in some detail in the previous 
section, considers the variance of the objective function value by considering the variance 
and covariance of the objective function contributions of the decision variables.  
Specifically, the expected objective function value is penalized by a risk aversion 
coefficient times the variance around the expected objective function value.  This forces 
the optimization to consider objective function risk with the goal of simulating utility 
maximizing decision making.  Numerous agricultural economic studies have utilized E-V 
analysis in a mathematical programming framework.  For example, Boisvert and McCarl 
list many publications, too numerous to mention here. 
 One concern associated with E-V formulation is that it results in a quadratic 
objective function.  Previously this has been a concern to some researchers given the 
complexity of a nonlinear model and the limitation of computational solvers.  As a 
response to this problem Hazell developed the MOTAD (Minimization of Total Absolute 
Deviations), which linearly approximates E-V results based on total absolute deviations.  
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However, a nonlinear objective function is not ordinarily a problem to modern solvers.  
McCarl and Onal state that it is generally more efficient to allow solvers to deal with 
nonlinear objective functions than to perform a linear transformation.  Since such solvers 
have been available it has been less necessary to rely on Hazell’s MOTAD formulation. 
 An additional concern that has been raised is that the assumption of a quadratic 
utility function is quite restrictive.  If this assumption is imposed it implies that absolute 
risk aversion increases with the level of payoff (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).  In 
response to this issue, Lambert and McCarl introduced DEMP (Direct Expected 
Maximizing Nonlinear Programming).  This technique is less restrictive in regard to form 
of the objective function but requires that the utility of wealth function be specified.  
While utilized to some degree DEMP is not as widely accepted as E-V analysis to model 
objective function risk. 
 Two other techniques that consider objective function risk are Safety First (Roy) 
and Target MOTAD (Tauer).  Safety First assumes that first and foremost a decision 
maker will make decisions such that some objective function value threshold is met.  
Similarly Target MOTAD considers a target income level and maximum allowable 
shortfall from this target.  While useful to some degree these techniques are not as 
powerful or robust as E-V analysis, given that they do not consider the total variance of 
objective function contribution and objective function value.  Therefore, neither is as 
observable in the economic literature as E-V analysis. 
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Technical Coefficient Risk 
 There can also be risk involved in the technical coefficients of inputs.  That is, 
variability in the decision variables contributions toward the fulfillment of model 
constraints.  This form of risk has a less pronounced presence in economic studies 
relative to objective function risk but some approaches are available. 
 Merrill offers an approach that is very similar to E-V analysis, both technically 
and intuitively.  Merrill suggests that a given constraint can be made more binding by 
adding a penalty term consisting of a risk aversion parameter times either the variance or 
standard deviation around the expected contributions of decision variables to that 
constraint.  This approach introduces nonlinearity into the constraints of mathematical 
programming model.  This has historically been more troublesome to deal with than 
objective function nonlinearity.  Wicks and Guise offer an alternative formulation that 
linearly approximates the variance or standard deviation of technical coefficients.  They 
utilize a MOTAD approach to arrive at total deviations.  The measure of total deviations 
is then transformed into the estimated standard deviation using a variant of the Fisher 
constant. 
 While the Wicks and Guise approximation was warranted at one time, solvers are 
now powerful enough to deal with nonlinear constraints directly in some cases.  McCarl 
and Onal cite General Algebraic Modeling Systems (GAMS) MINOS algorithm as an 
example of one such solver.  Furthermore, this study will demonstrate that this 
nonlinearity can be modeled directly without unreasonable complications and that 
Merrill’s approach can be feasible. 
 
  22 
Right Hand Side Risk 
 The final form of risk that is sometimes modeled in mathematical programming is 
right hand side (RHS) or available resource variability.  Cocks offers discreet stochasitc 
programming as one technique for modeling RHS risk.  While utilized to some degree, 
models often become cumbersome if numerous random variables are present.  
Researchers wishing to avoid this potential modeling difficulty often use Chance 
Constrained Programming.  McCarl and Spreen state that Chance Constrained 
Programming is one of the most commonly used techniques of modeling RHS risk.  
Charnes and Cooper introduced this technique to deal with RHS uncertainty.  The major 
requirement is that the decision maker be able to decide the frequency with which a 
constraint must be satisfied.  Given this information and the probability distributions of 
the RHS, risk associated RHS limits can be modeled. 
 
Study Application of Risk Analysis 
 The tools presented in this chapter can be used to model many forms of risk in 
agricultural decision making.  The following two chapters evaluate specific cases relying 
upon some of these tools.  Chapter III will introduce E-V analysis and Merrill’s approach 
into a minimum cost feed ration linear programming model to account for price and 
nutrient variability, respectively.  Chapter IV will utilize E-V and SDRF as means of 
evaluating government subsidized livestock insurance and comparing it to current risk 
management strategies. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
DETERMINING OPTIMAL RATIONS CONSIDERING FEED INGREDIENT 
NUTRIENT AND PRICE RISK 
 
 
Introduction 
The large amount of agricultural economic literature that addresses uncertainty in 
production agriculture indicates the importance of the ability of agricultural decision 
makers to manage risk (e.g., Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker; Boisvert and McCarl; and 
Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson; Robison and Barry).  Livestock producers are no 
exception and must make production decisions, such as input selection, in an uncertain 
environment. Feed is arguably the most important input, next to the actual animals, for a 
livestock operation in terms of impact on total expenses.  This is evident in 1999 National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) data for all livestock farms in the United States.  
NASS reports that expenditures on feed in 1999 comprised 26.1% of total farm 
expenditures, representing the single greatest farm expense.  Given this importance of 
feed to livestock operations, the selection of minimum cost feed rations using linear 
programming has, historically, been given considerable attention in agricultural economic 
research.  However, the consideration of the risks associated with feed ration selection in 
the agricultural economic literature has been very limited. 
Traditional linear programming minimum cost feed ration models are solved with 
the assumptions that all feed ingredient prices (objective function contributions) and 
nutrient levels (technical coefficients) are known with certainty.  These models are 
available to producers in the form of decision-making tools that formulate minimum cost
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 rations subject to nutritional constraints.  Once a producer chooses a ration for a typical 
backgrounding program, he or she will generally prefer to feed the same ration to a group 
of animals for the entire time that they are on feed.  Depending on the size of the 
operation and its feed storage capacity, this will usually require multiple purchases of the 
feed ingredients during the feeding period.  Therefore, if a ration is chosen by a model 
imposing the above assumptions, the producer is fully exposed to variability in the 
nutritional composition of feedstuffs from one purchase to the next. Furthermore, in the 
absence of any forward contracting or hedging activity, the producer is also vulnerable to 
fluctuations in feed ingredient prices.  This ration will not be optimal to the producer if he 
or she is risk averse regarding nutrient variability, price fluctuation, or both.  In past 
research, it has been necessary to impose the assumptions of certain prices and ingredient 
composition due to the limited computational power of solvers and the limited data on the 
variability of the nutritional composition of feedstuffs.  The ability of modern solvers to 
deal with nonlinearity and more complex models in general coupled with the availability 
of more complete feed ingredient nutritional data from the National Research Council 
(NRC) now make it possible to employ relatively unused mathematical programming 
techniques and avoid imposing either of these restrictive assumptions. 
A mathematical programming model that determines optimal feed rations by 
considering both feed ingredient nutrient and price variability can be achieved by 
relaxing both the assumption that technical coefficients are known with certainty and that 
objective function contributions are constant.  Merrill offers an approach for dealing with 
technical coefficient uncertainty.  Despite its intuitiveness, limitations of optimization 
solvers have prevented the utilization of this technique in any formal agricultural 
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economic literature since its conceptualization.  The recent availability of the 
aforementioned NRC feed ingredient nutrient variability data coupled with the need to 
address feed ingredient nutrient variability make it possible and worthwhile to utilize this 
technique in the ration selection process.  Essentially, Merrill’s approach allows the 
probability of satisfying constraints (e.g., nutritional constraints) to be increased subject 
to a decision maker’s aversion to technical coefficient risk.  In the case of feed ration 
selection, this will result in a greater ability to accurately predict animal weight gain and 
total days on feed.  The assumption that objective function contributions are constant can 
be relaxed using expected value variance (E-V) analysis.  E-V is a technique that is 
widely used to model uncertainty of objective function contributions in agriculture and 
allows decision makers to choose alternatives with a more a predictable net income or in 
the case of a feed ration model, a more predictable total ration cost.  Greater ability to 
predict total days on feed and ration cost results in greater ability to predict total feed 
cost.  This enhanced ability to predict total feed cost results in a less variable net income 
and can be accomplished by expanding the traditional minimum cost feed ration model 
using the aforementioned modeling techniques. 
This study will introduce these two components into the economic analysis of 
feed ration selection.  This will result in a more comprehensive mathematical 
programming model that incorporates consideration of both nutrient and price variability 
into the ration selection process.  Rations chosen with these considerations would be 
optimal to a decision maker subject to his or her level of aversion to each type of risk.  In 
addition to this practical application, this study will make other worthwhile contributions.  
It will be one of the only applications of Merrill’s technique, since its development, to 
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deal with technical coefficient uncertainty, which is generally difficult to address in any 
mathematical programming model.  Furthermore, introduction of the NRC feed 
ingredient nutrient variability data will represent one of the first uses of this data in 
economic research. 
The general objective of this study is to provide insight into how livestock and 
dairy producers can manage risks associated with selecting a feed ration. Specifically, 
this study analyzes how the consideration of feed ingredient price risk and nutrient 
variability affects the composition of optimal beef backgrounding3 rations.  In addition to 
making the aforementioned contributions, information resulting from this study will serve 
as a starting point for more advanced decision-making tools for large-scale livestock 
producers such as feedlots and dairies.  Specifically, tools can be designed to consider 
managing price risk and nutrient variability of feed ingredients and selecting feed rations 
that are optimal to individual producers.  
Literature associated with minimum cost feed rations, E-V analysis, and technical 
coefficient uncertainty will be presented and discussed to establish the theoretical 
framework of input selection facing uncertainty and to develop a methodology that 
specifically addresses feed ingredient price and composition risk.  The economic model 
incorporating nutrient and price risk management will be defined.  Finally, the results of 
this model will be presented for analysis and discussion with conclusions following. 
 
                                                                 
3 Backgrounding, as referred to throughout this paper, indicates producers who buy weaned calves 
weighing approximately 500 pounds to be sold at approximately 750 pounds.  The 250-pound gain is 
achieved through a 4 to 5 month feeding program that utilizes both hay and feed concentrates. 
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Background 
In basic production theory, prior to development of any risk analysis framework, a 
producer would know, with certainty, the prices and compositions of all inputs.  In this 
scenario the minimum cost combination of feed ingredients to achieve a target level of 
average daily gain could be found by plotting the isoquant that represents all possible 
combinations of feedstuffs that would achieve this gain and subsequently finding the 
tangency with an isocost line.  Since attributes of the inputs are deterministic, this point 
would also represent the optimal combination of feed ingredients that meet the nutritional 
requirements.  In the real world, this is obviously not the case.  Neither input prices nor 
the technical aspects of inputs (i.e., production effects) are known with certainty.  These 
uncertainties will affect producers differently, depending on their attitude toward price 
risk.  There have been adjustments to economic analysis to reflect these responses to risk.  
One economic analytical tool that identifies optimal input combinations from feasible 
inputs is mathematical programming.  Mathematical programming has also become more 
flexible to deal with these uncertainties that are present in the real world of agricultural 
decision making. 
The use of linear programming models that impose the above assumptions to 
select minimum cost feed rations has a long and well-established history.  Stigler 
considered the minimum cost diets that exactly meet the nutrient requirements for human 
subsistence in one of the earliest examples prior to the full development of linear 
programming.  However, the basic concept of satisfying a set of nutritional constraints 
while minimizing the cost of the diet is evident in Stigler’s work.  Traditional minimum 
cost feed ration models are set up in this very way and this basic formulation can be 
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modified to balance any type of ration for which these constraints are known (McCarl 
and Spreen). 
Waugh was among the first to apply this model formulation to the selection of 
minimum cost livestock feed rations.  Specifically, Waugh laid out a procedure using the 
then novel linear programming to formulate minimum cost dairy rations, noting that if all 
prices and nutritional compositions of feeds are known and properly specified then the 
resulting ration is indeed the minimum cost feasible ration.  McCarl and Spreen state that, 
after Waugh’s efforts, the determination of minimum cost feed rations for livestock has 
been one of the most common uses of linear programming (see Ashour et al.; Beneke and 
Winterboer; and  Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow for discussion and examples).  In 
addition to a pronounced presence in academic literature of the basic minimum cost feed 
ration methodology, there is also plethora of software packages designed for applied use 
by producers (e.g, Taurus from The University of California at Davis). 
While consideration of risk in studies focusing on minimum cost feed rations for 
livestock and dairy production is not prevalent, some examples exist.  Thomas et al. offer 
an analysis of minimum cost dairy rations.  Their study focused on the fact that the cost 
of relevant nutrients are not constant, even though traditional minimum cost feed ration 
models treat them as such.  Thomas et al. address this issue by estimating the cost of net 
energy for lactation (NEl), total digestible nutrients (TDN), and crude protein (CP) based 
on low, medium, and high prices of corn (a very common energy component of dairy 
rations).  They go on to show that using constant nutrient cost generally underestimates 
the cost of the ration. Other studies examining nutrient variability include Chen as well as 
Rahman and Bender.  Each of these studies provides an analysis based on a target 
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probability for a constraint.  Chen focuses on the protein requirement. In this formulation 
only protein variability is considered and an iterative modeling procedure is used.  Chen 
provides an example of formulating minimum cost poultry rations and shows that as the 
target probability of meeting protein requirement increases so does ration cost.  While 
this technique was appropriate at the time, modern solvers now allow for more efficient 
and exact modeling. 
Prevatt et al. offer an analysis of the feasibility of backgrounding and finishing 
cattle in Florida.  Minimum cost feed rations for backgrounding and finishing were 
determined based on available local and imported feeds.  The study found that the 
variation of feed costs over time drastically affected the variability of net returns to 
hypothetical backgrounding and finishing operations in Florida.  Using several levels of 
required net returns to management along with required rates of return associated with 
the risk of the returns, Prevatt et al. concluded that acceptance of beef backgrounding and 
finishing operations would depend upon individual risk preferences.  The study also 
confirmed that this risk associated with the livestock operations was due, in no small part, 
to variation over time of feed ingredient prices.  While both Thomas et al. and Prevatt et 
al. highlighted the effects of risk on the traditional approach to choosing minimum cost 
feed rations, no attempt was made to implement different modeling techniques.  This 
study will implement Merrill’s technique for modeling technical coefficient variability 
and an E-V framework to address both nutrient variability and price risk, respectively. 
Relative to management of objective function risk, the consideration of technical 
coefficients uncertainty has a considerably less pronounced presence in the economic 
literature.  Merrill offers one method for dealing with technical coefficient risk in which 
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the standard deviation (or variance) of the technical coefficient values are used to 
calculate the total standard deviation (or variance) of the constraint value based upon 
which decision variables enter the optimal solution.  This standard deviation (or variance) 
is multiplied by a risk aversion parameter.  The product of the two make up a penalty 
term that effectively makes the constraint more binding as the standard deviation of the 
technical coefficient value increases.  Constraints modified with this approach are 
nonlinear.  Due to the complexities associated with nonlinear constraints this modeling 
technique has gone relatively unused. 
Despite its intuitiveness, the modeling concerns have all but prevented use of 
Merrill’s technique.  However, Wicks and Guise do offer a linear approximation of 
Merrill’s approach.  While this approach is a variation of Merrill’s technique, it 
represents the most similar technique present in economic literature.  Therefore it is 
worthwhile to briefly review the Wicks and Guise study.  Wicks and Guise apply their 
modeling technique to the variability of feed available from pasture due to weather and 
other exogenous factors to Australian sheep and grain farms.  In the Wicks and Guise 
study, absolute deviations of pasture yield were calculated using Hazell’s MOTAD 
method.  The deviations were coupled with a variant of the Fisher constant to arrive at 
standard deviations.  Several levels of risk aversion were then analyzed to represent 
responses to technical coefficient risk across different producer risk attitudes.  Intuitively, 
this approach is very similar to an E-V framework.  That is, to decrease the variability of 
technical coefficients, a decision maker will realize a lower net income and depending on 
the individual’s attitude toward risk, will make tradeoffs accordingly.  Wicks and Guise 
even suggest that solutions from such a model should trace out a risk efficient frontier 
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similar to that of a usual E-V framework.  Furthermore, they state that the frontier should 
also provide a means of ranking farm plans for these sheep and grain operations much the 
same as Thompson and Hazell rank risk efficient farm plans using E-V analysis. 
McCarl and Spreen offer nutrient variability in feedstuffs, one issue on which this 
study focuses, as an example textbook application of the Wicks and Guise approach.  
However, in their example, a fixed amount of feed is being mixed as opposed to a ration 
mixed for the needs of specific animals and no empirical data are used to arrive at the 
nutrient variability of feed ingredients.  Other than the example given by McCarl and 
Spreen, Tice offers one of the only applications of the Wicks and Guise technique outside 
of the original study. 
E-V analysis (Markowitz, Freund) is very widely published in agricultural 
economic literature and deals with uncertainty of contributions to the objective function 
of a mathematical programming model, such as the prices of feed ingredients in a 
minimum cost feed ration model.  However, there has been considerable debate as to 
whether E-V analysis is a theoretically appropriate method to represent optimal decision 
making.  It is generally agreed upon that expected utility theory (von Neuman and 
Morgenstern) provides the theoretical base for choice facing uncertainty.  E-V analysis 
can be consistent with expected utility theory in three cases:  (1) the underlying income 
distribution is normal (Freund), (2) the distributions of the decision variable differ only 
by location and scale (Meyer), and (3) the underlying utility function is quadratic 
(Markowitz, Tobin).  If any of these conditions are present it is generally agreed upon 
that E-V analysis is indeed consistent with expected utility theory. Many applications to 
agricultural decision making have used the satisfaction of one or more of the 
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aforementioned conditions to justify the use of E-V to model the decisions of producers 
when faced with net income risk  (Boisvert and McCarl; Dillon, 1999; Dillon, 1992).  In 
addition to these studies empirical evidence demonstrates the closeness of E-V analysis to 
the expected utility maximizing choices (Levy and Markowitz).  Given this demonstrated 
consistency of E-V analysis with economic theory and its extensive use in modeling 
agricultural risk, it is an appropriate way to model an agricultural producer’s response to 
uncertainty of input or output prices. 
The well-established history of the feed ration linear programming formulation 
and the obvious impact of uncertainty on the selection of an optimal feed ration warrants 
the expansion of that formulation to allow producers to manage the risks associated with 
selecting a minimum cost feed ration.  The importance of nutrient variability in feed 
ingredients is evident in recent attention given it by animal science studies (Cromwell et 
al., DePeters et al.).  This importance makes it appropriate to give this form of risk ample 
consideration in selecting feed rations.  Expanding the traditional model to include the 
Wicks and Guise technique offers a method of doing just that.  The increasing acceptance 
of E-V analysis as a means of dealing with objective function risk suggests that it is a 
suitable means of addressing the uncertainty of feed ingredient prices. 
In the following section the data necessary to specify an economic model that 
combines the traditional minimum cost feed ration model with both Merrill’s approach 
and an E-V component is presented.  With this data the economic model is specified.  
Results showing how producers can utilize the model in the selection of a feed ration to 
manage both price risk and nutrient variability are then presented with conclusions 
following. 
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Data 
Feed ingredient prices were collected from Feedstuffs, for the Chicago market, 
between 1993 and 1999, with four exceptions.  Alfalfa hay and prairie grass hay prices 
were collected from the USDA Oklahoma weekly hay report for the same time period.  
Hay data were collected from Oklahoma due to the fact that no prolonged hay price series 
for the Chicago market could be found.  Current bulk prices for limestone and dicalcium 
phosphate were used in lieu of a historic price series.  Historic prices of these 
supplements are not generally recorded due to the extremely low variability and therefore 
could not be obtained.  This should not pose any limitations to the study since 
supplements such as limestone and dicalcium phosphate generally comprise a very small 
component of total ration cost and have price series that exhibit little variability.  All 
prices were left in nominal terms in the interest of simulating real world conditions in 
which producers face the risks associated with nominal prices of inputs.  Descriptive 
statistics for the price series of all feed ingredients being considered are presented in 
Table 3.1.  In addition to prices of feed ingredients, expected nutritional composition and 
variability must be specified. 
The expected levels and variability of nutrients in all feed ingredients were 
obtained from the 2001 NRC Nutrient Requirements of Dairy Cattle.  These data rely on 
various sources including the 1996 (and 2000 Update) NRC Nutrient Requirements of 
Beef Cattle.  The expected levels and standard deviations of the relevant nutrients are 
shown in Table 3.2. It should be mentioned that the standard deviations for NEg and 
NEm were not reported explicitly.  This is due to the fact that direct measurement of 
levels of NEm and NEg requires laborious feeding experiments.  The alternative to 
  34 
feeding experiments is to approximate amounts of the energies using accepted functional 
relationships, as defined by the NRC, between each of them and acid detergent fiber 
(ADF).  NRC 2001 reports ADF values and standard deviations allowing the standard 
deviation of ADF to be taken through the appropriate transformations to arrive at 
standard deviations for NEg and NEm.  A mathematical presentation of this 
transformation is presented in the Appendix to this chapter.  With the nutritional 
composition of the available feedstuffs specified, it is also necessary to determine the 
nutritional requirements of the animals to set the right hand side lower limits for the 
nutritional constraints within the model. 
The nutrient requirements for medium frame steers were obtained from the 1984 
Edition of NRC Nutrient Requirements of Beef Cattle.  Instead of using the reported 
tables, the equations that specify these requirements as they relate to body weight, target 
average daily gain, and dry matter intake were used.  This allows the model to determine 
a ration given only a body weight and target average daily gain and does not limit these 
values to integers.  These equations are presented as a part of the economic model in the 
following section.  This set of data fulfills the requirements of the specification of an 
economic model that considers both nutrient and price variability in the selection of feed 
rations.  These data are sufficient to specify a model that will address both feed ingredient 
nutrient variability and price fluctuation. 
 
The Economic Model 
The economic model in this study expands the traditional minimum cost feed 
ration model to the selection of rations that are optimal, given individual risk aversion, 
for a typical beef backgrounder facing uncertain feed ingredient prices and variable 
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nutrient levels in available feedstuffs.  Producers will respond differently to these 
uncertainties, depending on their attitude toward risk. The methodology in this particular 
study assumes that the producer will minimize total feed costs depending on his or her 
individual aversion to feed ingredient price risk and variability of nutrients in those feed 
ingredients and that this selection of an optimal ration is the equivalent of maximizing 
utility. 
The model is designed to choose the amount of each feed ingredient, in pounds, as 
fed per-head-per-day.  The objective function is specified as follows: 
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Indices include: 
t = time period (i.e., week) with T representing the total number of , 
j = individual feed ingredients and may represent corn, soybean meal (44% crude 
protein), soybean meal (49% crude protein), corn gluten feed, distiller’s dried grain, 
brewer’s dried grain, dehydrated alfalfa,wheat middlings; alfalfa hay, or prairie grass 
hay and  
i = individual nutrients and may represent net energy for maintenance (NEm), net energy 
available for gain (NEg), protein (pr), Calcium (Ca), or phosphorous (P) 
d = indicates that the amount of a nutrient is measured as fed in the actual ration. 
 
Endogenous decision variables are: 
RCt  = ration cost in time t, 
RC  = mean ration cost over all t, 
Fj = Feed ingredient j, and 
DMI = total dry matter intake of pounds of feed per day by an animal. 
 
Exogenous components of the model are: 
pj,t  = price of the jth feed ingredient in time t, 
W = body weight of the animal in kilograms and, 
ADG = target average daily weight gain in kilograms, 
GP = grams of protein deposited in the muscle tissue of an animal, and 
s2i,j = the variance of the ith nutrient in the jth feed ingredient 
 
Right hand side lower limits are: 
LLi = lower limits of all nutrients (i). 
 
Risk aversion parameters are: 
Y = nutrient variability aversion parameter and 
F = price risk aversion parameter. 
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The objective function (Equation 3.1) minimizes the risk-adjusted, mean total 
ration cost per head per day.  This is represented by RC  less a penalty for variability in 
RCt.  This penalty is composed of the variance of RCt across all time periods multiplied 
by the price risk aversion parameter F.  This price risk aversion parameter was specified 
using the approach offered by McCarl and Bessler in which F = 2 Za / Sy.  In this 
formulation aZ = the standardized normal one-tailed Z value of an a  level of 
significance, and yS  is the relevant standard deviation under risk neutral decisions levels.  
In this study, yS  was calculated using 500 pound medium frame steers being fed to 
achieve two pounds of average daily gain (ADG) by a producer with a risk neutral 
attitude.  This class of livestock is very common among Kentucky backgrounders and the 
risk aversion parameters resulting from this standard deviation should adequately 
represent a backgrounder’s attitude toward price variability across all sizes of livestock 
and all target average daily gains.  The E-V quadratic variance term obviously introduces 
non-linearity into this objective function.  The availability of non-linear programming 
(NLP) solvers makes it relatively easy to deal with this nonlinearity.  McCarl and Spreen 
suggest that in most cases it is no longer necessary to attempt to transform the objective 
function into a linear form and that it is often more efficient to allow the solver to deal 
with the nonlinearity.  The objective function is minimized subject to several necessary 
constraints (Equations 3.2 to 3.5). 
Equations 3.2 and 3.3 define RC and RC .  The sum of the prices of each feed 
ingredient (pj,t) times the amounts of the corresponding feed ingredient included in the 
ration (Fj) is equal to the total ration cost per head per day in time period t (RCt).  The 
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mean of RCt across all t is RC .  In addition to these constraints, the ration must meet 
certain nutritional requirements (also including a risk aversion component) as show in 
Equation 3.4.  Specifically, the ration must contain adequate amounts of NEm, NEg, 
protein, calcium, and phosphorous.  Equations 3.4a to 3.4h define nutritional lower limits 
for equation 3.4. 
Lower limits (LLi) for all nutrients considered by this model were specified using 
equations in the 1984 NRC Nutrient Requirements for Medium Frame Steers (as shown 
in Equations 3.4a to 3.4h).4  Equations 3.4a to 3.4c define the protein requirement.  This 
model uses the exact equations defined by the 1984 NRC guidelines to define this 
requirement.  In the past feed ration selection models have approximated dry matter 
intake as opposed to calculating the actual NEm in the ration in megacalories per 
kilogram (NEmd) and DMI directly.  This is largely due to the fact that the relationship 
between NEmd, DMI, and LLpr is nonlinear.  This particular study opts for calculation 
procedure of the protein requirement presented in NRC 1984 to avoid relying on an 
exogenous approximation of DMI.  The nonlinear constraints did not pose a problem to 
the NLP solver and this method will be closer to a true optimization than an approach that 
utilizes an approximation.  Calculation of the lower limits (LLi) for NEm, NEg, calcium, 
and phosphorous, which are linear, are shown in equation 3.4d through 3.4h, respectively. 
Another factor that separates this model from those in previous feed ration 
selection studies is that is does not assume that the amounts of all nutrients in all 
available feed ingredients are known with certainty.  Nutritional constraints for NEm, 
                                                                 
4 The 1984 version was chosen over the more recent editions, in part due to the use of crude protein (as 
opposed to metabolic protein) in specifying the protein requirements.  This avoids certain technical 
complexities.  These complexities warrant consideration in practical ration balancing applications and 
nutritional research but would add very little to this specific discussion. 
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NEg, and protein are expanded from traditional nutritional lower limit constraints to 
address the variability of these nutrients in available feed ingredients.  Specifically, these 
constraints are made more binding by multiplying the nutrient risk aversion parameter 
(Y) by the standard deviation of the relevant nutrient in the entire ration 
( ( )1/22 j , i2jF  så ).  Only binding constraints are affected by this approach (Wicks and 
Guise; McCarl and Spreen).  However, this poses no real problem since, as noted by 
McCarl and Spreen, uncertainty in non-binding constraints is of little concern to a 
decision maker.  However, for binding constraints it is reasonable that a decision maker 
would seek to manage the uncertainty surrounding the technical coefficients of inputs. 
The nutrient risk aversion parameter (Y) was specified assuming nutrient levels 
across feed ingredient samples are normally distributed.  Standardized normal one-tail z 
values corresponding to levels of risk aversion represent nutrient risk aversion 
parameters.  This ensures that the binding constraint(s) become more binding in a way 
that shows an individual’s desire to increase the probability of realizing the required 
nutrient level in a feed ration.  For example, to represent an individual who would prefer 
to be certain of realizing at least the required amount of a nutrient 65% of the time (as 
opposed to 50% of the time for risk neutral), the z score that represents the 65th percentile 
of the normal distribution was used.  The two exceptions to this are the constraints for 
phosphorous and calcium.  For these constraints it is assumed that Y is equal to zero.  
While the levels of calcium and phosphorous do vary in many available feed ingredients 
their levels are, for all practical purposes, constant in limestone and dicalcium phosphate.  
Since these ingredients can be used to fulfill the entire requirement for both calcium and 
phosphorous and still represent less than 3% of the ration cost, it is reasonable to assume 
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that decision makers would not devote time and energy to managing the variability to 
these minerals in the ration.  Variability of nutrients for all feedstuffs is defined as the 
standard deviation of nutrients (si,j) as reported in the 2000 NRC Nutrient Requirements 
of Beef Cattle.  This availability of standard deviations of nutrients in selected feed 
ingredients makes it possible to use these to directly model Merrill’s approach. 
With the economic model defined in this section it is possible to select rations that 
are not simply minimum cost but optimal to a decision maker given his or her aversion to 
nutrient variability and price risk.  The model will be specified for specific cases in the 
following section.  The results of these specifications will be presented and discussed.  
Following these results a brief summary along with conclusions will be offered. 
 
Selection of Optimal Rations  
Optimal rations were chosen for numerous model specifications to account for 
different weights of livestock (W), different target average daily gains (ADG), and 
various levels of aversion to nutrient and price risk. The livestock classification of 
medium frame steers was used in all cases and W was varied from 400 to 800 pounds in 
100-pound increments to account for the growth of animals in a typical backgrounding 
program.  ADG was varied across 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 pounds per day. Nutritional 
requirements for a 500-pound, medium frame steer, as calculated by the model, are as 
follows: 666.50 grams of crude protein, 29.31 grams of calcium, 14.70 grams of 
phosphorous, 2.93 megacalories of available NEg, and 4.51 megacalories of NEm.  
Requirements for all other sizes of livestock considered under each target ADG are not 
reported.  It is important to again note that these requirements are reported as calculated 
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by the model given only W and ADG.  Varying levels of both nutrient and price risk 
aversion were specified by varying aZ  in the calculation of each.  Varying levels of 
aversion to nutrient variability (Y) were considered over a wide range of significance 
levels.  Only the levels of 0.50 (risk neutral), 0.60 (low aversion), 0.80 (medium 
aversion), and 0.90 (high aversion), indicating a desire to realize at least the required 
amount of nutrients 50%, 60%, 80%, and 90% of the time, are reported.  Significance 
levels of 0.50 (risk neutral), 0.75, 0.80, and 0.85 represent the four reported levels of 
price risk aversion.  These represent an individual’s preference to realize the same or 
lower feed costs 50%, 75%, 80%, or 85% of the time, respectively. 
Optimal rations were then determined for all combinations of W, ADG, Y, and F.  
However, given the substantial amount of information this generated (240 separate model 
runs), only the optimal ration compositions for 500-pound medium frame steers fed for 2 
pounds ADG will be discussed.5 The compositions of the rations are presented in Table 
3.3.  The corresponding mean costs, standard deviations of costs, and coefficients of 
variation of cost are presented in Table 3.4. It should be noted that, while these rations 
meet basic nutritional needs, no formal constraint addresses the amount of roughage in 
the diet.  A certain level of roughage is needed to maintain rumen function.  Also, no 
formal constraint addresses total intake.  Inclusions of these constraints would allow for 
the calculation of more practical diets.  However the risk management principles that are 
central to this study can be adequately demonstrated without their inclusion.  Thus 
omitting these constraints should not detract from the overall value of the study.  From 
                                                                 
5 Results of other specifications were, qualitatively, very similar with respect of both price and nutrient risk 
management.  These results are available upon request from the authors. 
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these results it is possible to determine the model responses to both nutrient and price risk 
aversion as well as the costs of these responses. 
From the twelve available ingredients, the model balanced rations primarily using 
either a combination of corn and wheat middlings or corn and corn gluten feed.  
Distiller’s dried grain entered in small amounts as the aversion to nutrient risk was 
increased.  Limestone entered every ration as an inexpensive, non-variable source of 
minerals.  The amounts of limestone are very small and of consistent magnitude.  In the 
remainder of the discussion, no further mention will be given to limestone as a 
component of the ration.  These basic trends in the composition of the feed rations 
provide for interesting discussion concerning the management of price and nutrient risk 
to arrive at optimal rations. 
The minimum cost feasible ration assuming no aversion to nutrient or price risk is 
composed approximately equal amounts of corn and wheat middlings.  As aversion to 
nutrient risk is increased with no consideration given to price risk, the model effectively 
manages the variability of NEg, as the NEg constraint is the most binding constraint.  
Constraints for NEm, protein, calcium, and phosphorous are, in most cases, not binding 
and are therefore are virtually unaffected by Merrill’s approach.  As nutrient risk aversion 
is increased to the Low and even Medium level, the model response is to simply add 
more of the feed ingredient that comprised the minimum cost ration.  This appears to be 
the least cost method of increasing the probability of meeting the NEg requirement, since 
the increase in the mean amount of available NEg will be greater than that of the standard 
deviation.  The result is a total ration with a less volatile amount of NEg, in terms of 
coefficient of variation. 
  43 
An illustration of the risk management response described above is illustrated by 
increasing the probability of meeting the NEg requirement from 50% to 80% while 
ignoring price risk.  This adjustment involves increasing the amount of corn and wheat 
middlings by 0.84 and 0.02 pounds, respectively.  The result of this ration adjustment is 
that, with all external factors such as weather and health being equal, the probability that 
the animals will gain at least 2 pounds per day is increased from 50% to 80%.  The 
amount of NEg in the risk averse ration is less variable, in terms of the coefficient of 
variation.  This is shown in Table 3.5, which displays the effects of risk management on 
variability of NEg.  Specifically, the coefficient of variation decreases by 0.40%.  
However, as shown in Table 3.4, this increase in certainty of realizing the NEg 
requirement comes at a cost of about $0.03 per head per day.  It is also worthwhile to 
note that managing for nutrient variability, while ignoring price variability, generally 
results in a moderate increase.  This tradeoff between a higher ration cost and a higher 
probability of realizing the required NEg is presented as a frontier of nutrient risk 
efficient points in Figure 3.1. Selecting among rations located on the frontier would 
require a decision maker to compare the risk management benefit to the cost of achieving 
it given their attitude toward risk and choose accordingly.  In addition to controlling the 
variability of the NEg in the ration, the model can select rations with a more stable price 
series. 
Upon introduction of aversion to price risk, assuming nutrient risk neutrality, the 
model looks to substitute among available feedstuffs to arrive at an optimal ration.  At the 
75% price risk aversion level, wheat middlings leave the optimal combination entirely 
and corn gluten feed enters.  This is to be expected since, as shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.1, 
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the composition of the two feeds are very similar while corn gluten feed has a price series 
that is roughly half as variable, in terms of coefficient of variation.  All rations that are 
balanced assuming some level of aversion to price risk are primarily comprised of corn 
and corn gluten feed.  As price risk aversion increases, however, the amounts of corn 
gluten feed in the ration increases and the amount of corn decreases, proportionally (See 
Table 3.3).  This substitution of corn gluten feed for corn in optimal ration results in a 
decrease in the standard deviation and coefficient of variation of the price of the ration.  
Table 5 shows this reduction in volatility.  Much the same as nutrient risk management, 
price risk management comes at a cost.  Specifically, the optimal ration for a producer 
who is 75% price risk averse costs about $0.01 more per head per day compared to the 
risk neutral cost minimizing ration.  However the coefficient of variation is only 17.06%, 
compared to 23.65% for the risk neutral optimal ration.  Depending upon an individual’s 
attitude toward price risk, any of these rations listed in Table 3.3 might be optimal.  It 
would be up to the decision maker to select among all risk efficient choices, which would 
include some ration combinations not reported in Table 3.3, to arrive at a ration that 
matches his or her desire to control price variability. 
The set of available ration choices is presented in a mean-variance framework as 
an E-V frontier in Figure 2.  For the sake of a smoother graph, the figure contains several 
levels of risk aversion in addition to the reported levels.  This E-V frontier is presented as 
a set of risk efficient expenses and thus appears as the mirror image of the more common 
presentation of a set of returns.  This frontier shows the possibility of accepting higher 
expenses for the sake of less variable feed expenses and therefore the ability to manage 
net income risk with the selection of optimal feed rations.  Presenting such a frontier to a 
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producer allows a risk averse producer to see the increases in mean costs necessary to 
achieve a given variance of feed expense and then make tradeoffs to arrive at his or her 
optimal solution (McCarl and Spreen).  For example, in a 150-day backgrounding 
program, to achieve the price variance associated with the optimal ration for the most 
price risk averse producer $3.00 of revenue per head would be forgone.  While price and 
nutrient risk can be managed independently, the model can consider both simultaneously. 
It is important to examine the way in which managing for price risk affects 
nutrient variability and vice versa.  For instance, moving from price risk neutral to the 
75% level of price risk aversion while ignoring nutrient risk increases the standard 
deviation of NEg while the mean level remains the same.  This results in an increase in 
the coefficient of variation of NEg from 16.65% to 20.32%.  While other examples are 
less drastic, accounting for higher levels of price risk aversion within a given level of 
nutrient risk aversion always increases the variability (in terms of the coefficient of 
variation) of NEg.  On the other hand, managing for nutrient risk while holding price risk 
constant generally results in a slight decrease of the coefficient of variation of total ration 
cost.  The model has the capacity to manage both types of risks, but there are tradeoffs 
for doing so.  Depending upon a decision maker’s attitude toward nutrient variability 
and/or price risk he or she can evaluate these tradeoffs and determine individual optimal 
rations accordingly.  The results of this study indicate that after such an evaluation the 
ration that is optimal to a nutrient or price risk averse producer will be noticeably 
different than the minimum cost ration that would be recommended by traditional 
models. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
 Given the impact of feed cost on total livestock production expense the 
determination of a feed ration warrants careful consideration by livestock producers.  
Historically, agricultural economic research has approached this procedure by identifying 
the minimum cost combination of available feed ingredients that satisfy nutritional 
requirements using linear programming.  Linear programming models that select 
minimum cost feed rations have had a pronounced presence in academic research and are 
prevalent as applied decision tools.  Although useful, these models have generally 
imposed the assumptions that feed ingredient nutritional compositions and prices are 
known with certainty.  Livestock producers indeed do not know these with certainty and 
must select feed ingredients in a risky environment with regard to nutrient composition 
and prices of feed ingredients.  Therefore, it is worthwhile to expand the traditional 
models to choose optimal rations considering variability in the nutritional compositions 
and prices of feed ingredients. 
 The traditional model can be expanded to consider nutrient variability and price 
risk using Merrill’s approach and E-V analysis, respectively.  Expanding the model in 
this way makes both methodological and applied contributions to agricultural economic 
research.  The generally ignored issues of real world nutrient and price uncertainty are 
introduced into a very well researched area of livestock economics, that is, feed ration 
selection.  Results show that minimum cost feed rations are not optimal to all producers.  
Furthermore, the problematic issue of technical coefficient risk is addressed using a 
modeling technique that is novel with the exception of its initial application.  The 
expanded model allows decision makers to select rations that are optimal subject to their 
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aversion to nutrient variability and/or price risk.  Managing either type of risk comes at 
the expense increasing the ration cost.  If a decision maker evaluates the situation and 
determines that risk management benefits outweigh the expense then there are methods 
for dealing with both feed ingredient nutrient and price risk. 
 In general, producers wishing to control only the variability of nutrients in the 
ration should increase the amounts of the optimal ingredients.  The magnitude of this 
increase will vary depending on which ingredients are in the optimal ration with no 
consideration given to risk.  However this is not true when managing for both risks 
simultaneously.  In these cases the model does substitute among available ingredients by 
changing the relative amounts of ingredients in the ration and bringing in small amounts 
of new ingredients.  Controlling price risk requires substituting among inputs in all cases.  
In some cases new ingredients enter the optimal ration while at other times the relative 
amounts of the ingredients in the base ration is changed.  New ingredients are expected to 
have a higher expected price but will have a less variable price series, as was shown by 
corn gluten feed replacing wheat middlings.  Both types of risk management come at the 
expense of increasing ration cost.  For example, in this study a producer who is 80% risk 
averse with regards to nutrient variability and price variability would be willing to pay 
$0.12 per head per day above the price of the minimum cost ration to select a ration that 
is optimal to him or her.  Using these results and basic methods of managing nutrient and 
price risks advanced decision tools can be developed.  Alternative rations can be 
presented in the form of a set of risk efficient choices as was done in this study.  Decision 
makers can then weigh the costs and benefits of all feasible alternatives then formulate 
rations that are better suited to their individual attitude toward risk. 
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Appendix to Chapter III 
 
NRC 2000 reports the standard deviations of acid detergent fiber (ADF) in selected 
feedstuffs.  Metabolizable energy (ME) can be expressed as a linear function of ADF that 
depends upon the type of feed ingredient in question (American Feed Manufacturers 
Association).  Given this information, it is a very systematic procedure to transform the 
standard deviation of ADF into the standard deviation of ME.  The relationship between 
ME and both net energy for maintenance and net energy for gain is approximated by the 
NRC 1984 and 2000 as: 
 
(A3.1) NEm = 0.0105 ME3 – 0.138 ME2 + 1.37 ME – 1.12 
 
and 
 
(A3.2) NEg = 0.0122 ME3 – 0.174 ME2 + 1.42 ME – 1.65. 
 
The statistical properties of a function are such that for a function: 
 
(A3.3) Y = aX3 + bX2 + cX + d, 
 
where X is a normally distributed, random variable it is true that: 
 
(A3.4) Var(Y) = a2 [ E(x6) - E(x3)2] + b2 [E(x4) - E(x3)2] + c2[E(x2) – E(x)2 ] 
  + 2ab[E(x3) - E(x3) E(x2)] + 2ac[E(x4) - E(x3) E(x)] 
  + 2bc[E(x3) - E(x2) E(x)]. 
 
In this notation, E(xi)k represents the ith moment of x raised to the kth power (if k is 
omitted it is understood that k = 1).  It is possible to derive the standard deviations for 
NEm and NEg in feedstuffs for which standard deviations of ADF are reported based on 
the first six moments of the functions for NEm and NEg expressed in terms of ME.  
Assuming that NEg, NEm, and ME are normally distributed these moments can be 
expressed in terms of the mean and variance of those functions using the moment 
generating function: 
 
(A3.5) 
( )2 j , ME2   1/2t  mt e s+  
 
where the limit of the ith derivative of e with respect to t as t approaches zero is the ith 
moment of the distribution.  Following this procedure, the first six moments of the ME 
distribution were calculated and used to arrive at the standard deviations of NEm and 
NEg in every feed ingredient. 
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Table 3.1.  Descriptive Statistics of Feed Ingredient Price Series Available to the 
Model 
 
 Mean  Standard Deviation C.V.1 Max Min 
 ($ / ton) ($ / ton) (%) ($ / ton) ($ / ton) 
 
Alfalfa Hay 93.03 13.77 14.81 125.00 55.00  
Brewer’s Dried Grain  102.81 25.15 24.47 155.00 65.00 
Corn 97.12 22.09 22.74 187.50 71.43 
Corn Gluten Feed 96.50 13.97 14.47 141.00 76.00 
Dehydrated Alfalfa 128.17 12.18 9.51 150.00 110.00 
DiCalcium Phosphate 380.00 0.00 0.00 380.00 380.00 
Distiller’s Dried Grain  124.62 16.26 13.05 185.00 93.00 
Limestone  110.00 0.00 0.00 110.00 110.00 
Prairie Grass Hay 66.62 9.35 14.04 82.50 50.00 
Soybean Meal (44%)2 193.12 37.53 19.44 299.00 136.00 
Soybean Meal (49%)2 205.93 36.85 17.89 310.00 148.00 
Wheat Middlings 74.55 21.01 28.18 150.00 45.00 
 
Source:  Alfalfa and Prairie Grass Hay were taken from various weekly USDA Oklahoma Hay reports, 
prices for Limestone and Dicalcium Phosphate are November 2000 bulk prices, all other price series came 
from 365 consecutive weekly observations from Ingredient Market Report.  Feedstuffs.  1993 to 1999. 
1.  C.V. = coefficient of variation and is the standard deviation expressed as a percentage of the mean. 
2.  44% and 49% represent the estimated crude protein available in each type of soybean meal 
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Table 3.2.  Dry Matter Basis Nutritional Composition of Feed Ingredients 
 
 Dry Matter NEm1 NEg1 Crude Protein Calcium Phosphorous 
 (%) (Mcal/kg)  (Mcal/kg)  (%) (%) (%) 
 
Alfalfa Hay 90.90 1.14 0.58 17.00 1.19 0.24 
 (2.06) (0.137)4 (0.144) 4  (1.63) (0.01) (0.06) 
 
Brewer’s Dried Grain  90.20 1.51 0.91 29.20 0.29 0.70 
 (3.70) (0.014) 4  (0.015) 4  (13.0) (0.10) (0.05) 
 
Corn 90.00 2.24 1.55 9.80 0.03 0.32 
 (0.88) (0.194) 4  (0.211) 4  (1.06) (0.07) (0.04) 
 
Corn Gluten Feed 90.00 1.94 1.30 23.80 0.07  0. 95 
 (1.69) (0.174) 4  (0.188) 4  (1.06) (0.05) (0.29) 
 
Dehydrated Alfalfa 91.80 1.34 0.77 18.90 1.51 0.25 
 (1.50) (0.057) 4  (0.060) 4  (0.68) (0.13) (0.02) 
 
DiCalcium Phosphate 97.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.00 19.30 
 (0.00) (0.00) 4 (0.00) 4 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Distiller’s Dried Grain  90.30 2.18 1.50 30.40 0.26 0.83 
 (2.19) (0.340) 4  (0.368) 4  (3.55) (0.23) (0.15) 
 
Limestone  1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.00 0.02 
 (0.00) (0.00) 4 (0.00) 4 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Prairie Grass Hay2 91.00 1.00 0.45 6.40 0.35 0.14 
 (1.42) (0.137) 4  (0.144) 4  (1.63) (0.01) (0.06) 
 
Soybean Meal (44%)3 89.10 2.06 1.40 49.90 0.40 0.71 
 (1.22) (0.004) 4  (0.004) 4  (1.25) (0.11) (0.04) 
 
Soybean Meal (49%)3 90.90 2.06 1.40 51.80 0.46 0.73 
 (1.88) (0.228) 4  (0.247) 4  (3.45) (0.80) (0.20) 
 
Wheat Middlings 89.30 1.60 1.00 18.7 0.17 1.01 
 (1.49) (0.017) 4  (0.018) 4  (1.15) (0.15) (0.13) 
 
Source:  2000 Update of the 1996 National Resource Council (NRC) Nutrient Requirements for Beef Cattle 
Note:  The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  Some the relative standard deviations were 
considered suspect according to expert opinion.  Specifically, the NEg variability of corn relative to wheat 
middlings was higher than anticipated.  Changing these data could obviously affect the model results as the 
NEg constraint is the most binding.  Experimentation on the relative variability based on more recent feed 
ingredient data (NRC 2001) did not qualitatively alter the results. 
1.  NEm = Net Energy Required for Maintenance, NEg = Net Energy Required for Gain 
2.  No standard deviation for ADF in prairie grass was reported, therefore NEm and NEg variances for 
alfalfa hay were used to approximate the corresponding variances in prairie grass hay. 
3.  44% and 49% represent the estimated crude protein concentration in each type of soybean meal on an as 
fed basis.  The compositions are reported on a dry matter basis, resulting in higher reported protein levels. 
4.  Variability data for Soybean Meal (44%) was questionable due to a very small sample size.  Due to this 
variability data for Soybean Meal (49%) was also used for Soybean Meal (49%). 
5.  The standard deviations for NEm and NEg are not reported by the NRC but were calculated based on 
their functional relationship to Acid Detergent Fiber (ADF) and the NRC reported standard deviations for 
ADF.  See the appendix to this chapter for a detailed explanation of this relationship. 
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Table 3.3.  Compositions of Feed Rations for 500 pound Medium Frame Steers Fed 
for 2 Pounds Average Daily Gain Across Price and Nutrient Risk Aversion Levels 
Price Risk Nutrient Corn  Wheat Distiller’s Corn Gluten Limestone 
Aversion1 Risk Aversion2  Midds Dried Grain  Feed 
(%)    (Pounds / head / day on an As Fed Basis) 
 
50 Neutra 5.64 5.80   0.16 
 Low 5.95 5.82   0.16 
 Medium 6.38 5.82   0.16 
 High 1.17 12.86   0.13 
 
75 Neutral 5.74   4.47 0.18 
 Low 5.58   5.11 0.18 
 Medium 5.64   5.61 0.17 
 High 5.54  0.56 5.63 0.17 
 
80 Neutral 4.88   5.48 0.18 
 Low 5.04   5.75 0.18 
 Medium 5.18  0.20 5.91 0.17 
 High 5.17  0.73 5.84 0.17 
 
85 Neutral 4.23   6.24 0.17 
 Low 4.58   6.29 0.17 
 Medium 4.74  0.44 6.12 0.17 
 High 4.84  0.89 6.04 0.17 
 
Note: While these rations meet basic nutritional needs, no formal constraint was specified to address the 
amount of roughage in the diet.  A certain level of roughage is needed to maintain rumen function.  Also, 
no formal constraint addresses total intake. 
1.  Feed price risk aversion coefficients were calculated via the procedure offered by McCarl and Bessler.  
A brief explanation of the interpretation of this coefficient is presented in the text of this paper.  See 
McCarl and Bessler for a detailed presentation. 
2.  Nutrient risk aversion coefficients are the standardized normal one-tailed Z values corresponding to 0.50 
(Neutral), 0.60 (Low), 0.80 (Medium), and 0.90 (High) levels of significance. 
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Table 3.4.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Coefficients of Variation (C.V.) of Feed 
Ration Costs for 500-pound Medium Frame Steers Fed for Two Pounds Average 
Daily Gain Across Price and Nutrient Risk Aversion Levels 
Price Risk Nutrient 
Aversion1 Risk Aversion2  Mean Standard Deviation C.V. 
(%)  (Dollars / head / day) (%) 
 
50 Neutral 0.499 0.118 23.65 
 Low 0.515 0.121 23.50 
 Medium 0.535 0.126 23.55 
 High 0.543 0.146 26.89 
 
 Neutral 0.504 0.086 17.06 
75 Low 0.527 0.088 16.70 
 Medium 0.554 0.092 16.61 
 High 0.585 0.094 16.07 
 
80 Neutral 0.511 0.083 16.24 
 Low 0.531 0.086 16.20 
 Medium 0.559 0.090 16.10 
 High  0.588 0.093 15.82 
 
85 Neutral 0.516 0.081 15.70 
 Low 0.535 0.085 15.89 
 Medium 0.563 0.089 15.81 
 High 0.591 0.092 15.57 
 
1.  Feed price risk aversion coefficients were calculated via the procedure offered by McCarl and Bessler.  
A brief explanation of the interpretation of this coefficient is presented in the text of this paper.  See 
McCarl and Bessler for a detailed presentation. 
2.  Nutrient risk aversion coefficients are the standardized normal one-tailed Z values corresponding to 0.50 
(Neutral), 0.60 (Low), 0.80 (Medium), 0.90 (High) levels of significance. 
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Table 3.5.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Coefficients of Variation (C.V.) of Net 
Energy Available for Gain in Rations for 500-pound Medium Frame Steers Fed for 
Two Pounds Average Daily Gain Across Price and Nutrient Risk Aversion Levels 
 
Price Risk Nutrient 
Aversion1 Risk Aversion2  Mean StDev C.V. 
(%)  (Mcal) (Mcal) (%) 
 
50 Neutral 2.933 0.488 16.65 
 Low 3.131 0.515 16.44 
 Medium 3.397 0.552 16.24 
 High 3.111 0.139 4.48 
 
75 Neutral 2.933 0.603 20.56 
 Low 3.172 0.621 19.59 
 Medium 3.481 0.651 18.69 
 High 3.766 0.650 17.26 
 
80 Neutral 2.933 0.596 20.32 
 Low 3.171 0.620 19.54 
 Medium 3.470 0.638 18.38 
 High 3.757 0.643 17.11 
 
85 Neutral 2.933 0.603 20.57 
 Low 3.173 0.624 19.68 
 Medium 3.461 0.628 18.13 
 High 3.752 0.639 17.04 
 
 
1.  Feed price risk aversion coefficients were calculated via the procedure offered by McCarl and Bessler.  
A brief explanation of the interpretation of this coefficient is presented in the text of this paper.  See 
McCarl and Bessler for a detailed presentation. 
2.  Nutrient risk aversion coefficients are the standardized normal one-tailed Z values corresponding to 0.50 
(Neutral), 0.60 (Low), 0.80 (Medium), 0.90 (High) levels of significance. 
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Figure 3.1.  Mean-Probability Frontier of Nutrient Risk Efficient Ration Choices for 
a 500-Pound Medium Frame Steer Fed for Two Pounds Average Daily Gain 
Assuming Price Risk Neutrality 
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Figure 3.2.  Mean-Variance (E-V) Frontier or Risk Efficient Ration Choices for a 
500-Pound Medium Frame Steer Fed for Two Pounds Average Daily Gain 
Assuming Nutrient Risk Neutrality 
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CHAPTER IV 
INTRODUCING THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED 
LIVESTOCK INSURANCE AS A RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL 
 
 
Introduction 
Over the past few years, there has been a noticeable change in agricultural policy 
that has involved expanding the role of risk management and insurance.  Subsidized crop 
insurance that insures either crop yields or revenues has been the focus of much 
legislation and debate.  In general, crop insurance programs involve government 
subsidies to producers to cover a portion of insurance premiums along with reinsurance 
(and, in some cases, direct subsidies) to private firms that provide the insurance.  While 
these programs offer farmers a means of risk management, they have often been costly 
and have drawn criticism for the incentives they create (Skees 1999a, Turvey).  Recent 
legislation has now cleared the way to introduce similar insurance programs for livestock.  
Currently, the USDA’s Risk Management Agency is evaluating proposals for livestock 
insurance products to be used in pilot programs.  Like crop insurance programs, these 
programs have the potential to establish risk sharing markets that will allow producers to 
manage net income risk associated with livestock production and, if subsidized by the 
government, also have the potential to introduce perverse incentives to livestock 
producers.  With this in mind, it is worthwhile to carefully evaluate the situation of 
livestock producers and the potential effects of subsidized livestock insurance. 
Given the lack of vertical integration or cooperation in the beef industry, beef 
producers generally have limited opportunity to share the risk of their respective 
operations and are left to design individual risk management strategies.  One type of risk
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 that greatly influences profitability is marketing or price risk.  Futures market hedging 
and cash forward contracting provide opportunities to manage price risk.  However, these 
alternatives come at a cost.  For example, futures options offer a mechanism to establish a 
price floor for some premium.  If futures markets function efficiently, this premium 
reflects the true value of the option.  Producers realize that they will not always exercise 
these options and therefore in some years will actually forgo income in exchange for 
being insured against possible loss. Thus, the option premium (and therefore the risk it is 
priced to manage) is internalized into their decision-making process.  In general, the 
premiums a producer will expect to pay are at least as much as the payments they realize, 
over the long run.  The same can be said for actuarially fair price insurance, which 
functions much like a European put option and can only be exercised when it expires.  As 
long as these instruments are fairly priced, decision makers will choose to utilize them or 
not based upon their individual risk preference.  Specifically, more risk averse producers 
will forgo a larger proportion of expected income to realize a given decrease in the 
variability of that income. 
 If the same risk management instruments are offered with subsidized premiums, 
the true risk is not internalized into the decision-making process and as a result, 
producers will be inclined to take on more risk than they would with fairly priced 
insurance (Skees 1999b).  In the case of beef production, this can mean producing more 
beef and/or producing beef under riskier conditions.  As producers realize that the true 
value of the insurance is greater than the amount they must pay, they are likely to expand 
their operations to levels that result in their being exposed to the same level of risk as 
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they were prior to the subsidy.  This behavior has been shown in some studies regarding 
subsidized crop insurance and crop production (Skees 1999a and 1999b, Turvey). 
 The general objective of this study is to highlight the effects of government 
subsidized insurance on the actual risk faced by livestock producers.  Three possible 
marketing alternatives that a livestock producers might face will be evaluated: (1) selling 
feeder cattle with no means of price protection, (2) purchasing actuarially fair European 
put options, and (3) purchasing insurance in the form of European put options with a 
portion of the premium subsidized by the government.  Each alternative will be ranked 
according to its risk efficiency for a variety of risk attitudes ranging from risk preferring 
to risk neutral to risk averse.  Ranking will be done using Expected Value Variance (E-V) 
Analysis and Stochastic Dominance Criteria.  Consequently, a contribution of this study 
that goes beyond the objectives will be a comparison on stochastic dominance and E-V 
analysis that will highlight similarities and differences in the performance of the two 
commonly used dominance criteria.  Results from both dominance analyses will be used 
in conjunction with economic theory and related prior research to meet the specific 
objectives of this study.  These objectives include identifying which marketing 
alternatives are preferred for different levels of risk aversion, measuring the impact of 
subsidization on this preference and forming hypotheses of the possible effects of 
subsidized insurance on beef production decisions.  While not testable at this point due to 
lack of data, such hypotheses will represent a useful focus for future research in this area.  
Results will be of interest to policy makers wishing to implement programs that allow 
livestock producers to manage marketing risk while introducing appropriate incentives to 
these producers. 
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 To complete this analysis, it will be necessary to present a brief review of choice 
under uncertainty.  This will be followed by an explanation of how the three previously 
mentioned marketing alternatives of a livestock producer are simulated.  The three 
alternatives can then be ranked and the results of this ranking can be discussed and 
conclusions can be drawn.  
 
Choice Facing Uncertainty 
There has been a considerable amount of research directed at economic behavior 
facing uncertainty.  The classic model for choice under uncertainty is the expected utility 
framework as proposed by von Neuman and Moargenstern.  In this framework, an 
individual will maximize utility subject to the probabilities of the occurrence of available 
alternatives.  The way that a decision maker responds to the risk surrounding the 
alternatives is therefore dependent upon his or her utility function.  Some individuals will 
prefer risky ventures due to the possibility of large payoffs.  These individuals are 
typically said to be risk preferring.  Some decision makers might have risk neutral 
attitudes and will give no consideration to the riskiness of an alternative but rather base 
decisions on the expected or mean outcome.  The remaining individuals are said to be 
risk averse.  This class of risk averse decision makers has been the subject of many 
economic studies, too numerous to mention here. 
 Decision makers that are risk averse will seek to manage the risk associated with 
their alternatives and, in some cases, will even be willing to pay to avoid entering into a 
risky situation (Arrow, Pratt).  This risk attitude is the fundamental basis for insurance.  If 
a decision maker’s utility function is known, the risk premium that they will pay to avoid 
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a risky situation can be quantified and used to arrive at willingness to pay for insurance 
(Pratt).  However, the specification of utility functions for livestock producers (as well as 
any group of individuals) would be extremely time consuming and arduous.  Therefore 
this paper will rely on methodologies that circumvent the problems associated with 
specifying decision makers’ utility functions. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
While theoretically sound, the von Neumann and Moargenstern approach is very 
difficult to use in an applied sense, as it requires that the utility function of the decision 
maker be known and specified.  Since it is neither practical or, in some cases, even 
possible to specify a decision maker’s utility function, many alternative procedures have 
been developed to rank risky alternatives.  In general these approaches are designed to 
present a risk efficient set of choices, which is a subset of all available choices, and allow 
decision makers to choose from them.  Any alternative not in the risk efficient set is said 
to be risk dominated and should not be considered by the decision maker.  Two widely 
used techniques that follow this general framework are expected value variance (E-V) 
analysis and stochastic dominance criteria. 
E-V analysis (Markowitz, Freund) is widely published in agricultural economic 
literature as means for ranking risky decisions.  However, there has been debate as to 
whether E-V analysis is a theoretically appropriate method to represent optimal decision 
making.  It is generally agreed upon that expected utility theory (von Neuman and 
Moargenstern) provides the theoretical base for choice facing uncertainty.  E-V analysis 
is consistent with expected utility theory in three cases:  (1) the underlying income 
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distribution is normal (Freund), (2) the distributions of the decision variable differ only 
by location and scale (Meyer 1987), and (3) the underlying utility function is quadratic 
(Markowitz, Tobin).  If any of one of these conditions is present it is generally agreed 
upon that E-V analysis is indeed consistent with expected utility theory.  In addition to a 
presence of many economic studies, empirical evidence demonstrates the closeness of E-
V analysis to the expected utility maximizing choices (Levy and Markowitz). 
 In this study it is necessary, as mentioned earlier, to simulate livestock prices.  In 
general, prices are not expected to be normally distributed and therefore the returns 
associated with prices may or may not be normally distributed.  Furthermore, comparing 
a case of no price protection with purchasing a put option, which effectively truncates a 
distribution at a certain price (strike price – premium), ensures that the two alternatives 
do not differ only by location and scale.  Given these shortcomings, only under the 
assumption of a quadratic utility function can E-V be expected to be consistent with 
expected utility theory.  This assumption is rather restrictive, given that it implies that 
absolute risk aversion increases as the level of payoff increases so that at some level 
marginal utility of wealth becomes negative (Robison and Barry; Hardaker, Huirne, and 
Anderson).  Even though these assumptions are not met, E-V analysis is still a strong 
analytical tool.  Robison and Barry provide a detailed discussion of why this is true.  In 
the context of this study, E-V analysis provides a straightforward method of calculating 
the willingness to pay for a particular marketing alternative.  Such a measure will provide 
results necessary for achieving the aforementioned goals of this study.  A brief 
explanation of E-V analysis as it applies to this study is presented in the following 
paragraph. 
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If alternatives A and B are mutually exclusive and/or not correlated, they can be 
ranked by calculating the certainty equivalent (CE) or risk adjusted returns for each 
alternative using E-V analysis as follows: 
(4.1)     CEA  = E(A) - F(Var(A)) 
(4.2)     CEB  = E(B) - F(Var(B)) 
where E(A) and E(B) are the expected values of A and B, respectively and Var(A) and 
Var(B) represent the variance of each.  F is a risk aversion coefficient.  If CEA > CEB 
then A dominates B, if the two are equal then both A and B might be in the risk efficient 
set of choices.  However, for two choices with equal expected returns, the one with the 
lower variance is preferred (i.e., the risk dominant choice). 
 Given that the assumptions required for E-V to be consistent with expected utility 
theory may not hold in this study, another test for dominance should be used to test the 
robustness of the E-V results.  For this reason, the choices will be analyzed using 
stochastic dominance (SD) criteria as a means of ranking livestock marketing strategies.  
Three types of stochastic dominance are generally used to rank risky choices.  These are 
first degree stochastic dominance (FSD), second degree stochastic dominance (SSD), and 
stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF) or generalized stochastic 
dominance (Meyer 1977).  SDRF is the most discriminatory and flexible test for risk 
dominance among the three SD criteria mentioned (Robison and Barry; Hardaker, 
Huirne, and Anderson).  Also, FSD and SSD can be shown to be special cases of SDRF 
(see Meyer for explanation).  These characteristics of SDRF make it the most robust and 
useful tool for this analysis.  FSD and SSD will be referred to in parts of the analysis but 
the reliance upon ranking choices will be placed upon SDRF. 
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 Unlike E-V analysis, which is based solely on the first two moments of a 
distribution, SD criteria consider the entire distribution and therefore can generally deal 
with non-normality of the distributions involved.  This is because SD places fewer 
restrictions on the utility function of the decision maker and bases risk dominance on the 
entire cumulative distribution function (CDF) of each alternative. 
SDRF, like E-V, introduces the advantages of knowing a decision maker’s 
preferences without actually eliciting utility functions.  This is accomplished by relying 
on the specification of upper (FU) and lower (FL) bounds of the Pratt risk aversion 
coefficient, which is often easier to estimate than a utility function (Hardaker, Huirne, 
and Anderson).  Assuming an individual has a utility function U(y), then the Pratt 
coefficient is equal to: 
(4.3) 
Once FL and FU have been specified then a U(y) that minimizes 
(4.4) 
 
is found.  If the expression is positive then A is preferred to B.  If the expression is zero, 
SDRF cannot rank the two alternatives.  If the expression is negative, B might be 
preferred to A.  To verify this A(y) – B(y) is substituted into the brackets and the 
expression is reevaluated.  If the minimum of new expression is positive then B is 
definitely preferred to A.  If the expression is again negative, SDRF cannot rank the 
alternatives. 
 Both E-V and SDRF require the estimation of risk aversion coefficients.  McCarl 
and Bessler offer a method for calculating the Pratt risk aversion coefficient when the 
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utility function is unknown.  In their formulation the decision maker is said to maximize 
the lower limit of a confidence interval from a normally distributed set of returns.  The 
formula is: 
(4.5)     
y
 
S
2Z a=F  
where F = risk aversion parameter, aZ = the standardized normal one-tailed Z value of 
an a  level of significance, and yS  is the relevant standard deviation under risk neutral 
returns.  This method will be used to estimate risk aversion coefficients for both E-V and 
SDRF.  Sy is represented by the standard deviation of the expected price assuming the 
producer does not attempt to manage price risk (this expected price will be defined in 
detail later in the paper) and Za will be specified from 5% to 95% in 2.5% increments.  In 
this formulation, Za = 50% is considered to be risk neutral while Za greater than 50% is 
risk averse and Za less than 50% is risk preferring.  Some of the extreme values of Za are 
not likely realistic levels of risk preference for agricultural producers but serve to 
illustrate how individuals of different levels of risk aversion respond to available choices. 
The ranking of the three aforementioned beef cattle marketing strategies will be 
completed in the following sections of this paper.  First, it will be necessary to specify the 
type of beef producer to be analyzed and make any necessary assumptions.  Then the 
alternatives of no price protection, fairly priced European put options and subsidized 
price insurance can be ranked using E-V and SDRF.  After establishing the analytical 
procedure of this study, the results of all the analysis will then be reported and discussed 
with conclusions following this discussion. 
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Analytical Procedure 
Assumptions Regarding the Livestock Producer 
When examining livestock production it is often necessary to limit the 
examination to a specific level of production.  This is because different levels of livestock 
production may require very different management practices and decision-making 
procedures.  For example, cow-calf producers must purchase breeding stock and expect 
to recover this investment over a period of a few years.  Backgrounders, on the other 
hand, purchase weaned calves (approximately 500 pounds) and sell them to feedlots a 
few months later as feeder cattle (approximately 750 pounds).  They are more concerned 
about short run prices and conditions than cow-calf producers.  For the purposes of this 
study, backgrounders will be used. 
 The assumption will be made that the backgrounder purchases weaned calves and 
will sell them in 150 days.  Therefore, the producer is concerned with the expected price 
of feeder cattle 150 days from the date of purchase.  One common method of estimating 
this expected price is the feeder cattle futures market contract.  Specifically, the price of 
the feeder cattle contract that will expire in roughly 150 days will represent the expected 
price for a producer with no price protection.  In fulfillment of the goals stated earlier, 
this study will approximate the risk associated with this expected price and offer two risk 
management strategies to determine producers’ willingness to manage price risk using 
fairly priced European put options and subsidized price insurance that is structured as a 
European put option. 
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Simulation of Expected Prices 
Representation of the risk associated with the expected price when no risk 
management strategy is used requires further specification of the distribution of possible 
prices.  The use of historic prices for this specification would likely complicate this 
analysis.  There would inevitably be price movements that are specific to the time period 
chosen and therefore the volatility of those prices may only be appropriate in the context 
of that specific time period.  A more general specification of prices that represents a 
realistic level of price volatility circumvents these potential problems.  This specification 
can be accomplished based upon the variance and mean of an expected feeder cattle 
futures price. 
Many consulting services report implied volatilities of futures market contracts.  
These are usually calculated using Black’s formula for pricing futures options.  A known 
premium and strike level are used to solve for the implied volatility.  This measure of 
volatility represents the anticipated coefficient of variation of the distribution of possible 
prices for a contract.  It is then a matter of simple arithmetic to derive the standard 
deviation and variance for the distribution.  This study will use $88.50 / cwt the expected 
price and 11.0% as the volatility measure (which was the futures price level and implied 
volatility for the September feeder cattle futures contract as reported by PM Publishing 
Options Analysis in mid April 2001).  This results in a standard deviation of $9.74 / cwt 
and a variance of 94.77.  As stated earlier, normally distributed prices are not commonly 
observed.  It is more likely that these prices will take on a distribution similar to a gamma 
distribution.  Based on the first two moments of the distribution (mean and variance), a 
cumulative function of the gamma distribution can be fully specified.  This function can 
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be inverted such that for a given probability, it returns a number that is expected to occur 
at that probability level in the gamma distribution.  By selecting 1000 random 
probabilities, ranking them in ascending order, and inserting them into the gamma 
distribution one at a time, an accurate representation of the distribution around the 
expected price can be obtained.  This distribution will represent the marketing alternative 
of selling feeder cattle with no means of price protection and will be referred to as NoIns. 
 Two price risk management strategies will also be proposed.  The first will be 
European put options, noted as PRM.  These options can be purchased by producers to 
establish a price floor and can only be exercised at the time of maturity (i.e., 
approximately the sale date of the feeder cattle).  This alternative is simulated based on 
the first alternative.  A strike level and price are selected.  This study will use a 95% 
strike level, which translates into a $84.07 / cwt strike level or price floor.  With the first 
distribution ranked in ascending order each observation ni is evaluated.  If is it less than 
$84.07 / cwt then an indemnity payment (IPi) is added to it so that it equals $84.07 such 
that, 
(4.6)     
$84.07.  n , 0  IP
and $84.07  n , n - $84.07  IP
ii
iii
³"=
<"=
 
As a starting point for the analysis, the option premium will be calculated based on these 
actual payments rather than on an option pricing formula.  This premium (PREM) is 
calculated as: 
(4.7)     å=
i
if IPN
1
  PREM . 
In this formulation PREM is simply the average of all payments.  N is the total number of 
simulated prices and all other variables maintain their previous definitions.  This 
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specification of PREMf ensures that the total of all IPi equals the total of all PREMf, thus 
the options are actuarially fair.  With the previously specified strike level, PREMf = $2.02 
/ cwt.  This method of calculating an actuarially fair premium provides a straightforward, 
simple analysis of the effects of options and subsidized insurance on risk and has been 
used for these reasons in other insurance studies (e.g, Williams et. al).  It is also useful to 
analyze the options using a theoretically correct premium. 
 Black offers a method for calculation of a theoretical premium price for futures 
options that results in premium that more closely resembles premiums actually paid by 
producers.  Harrison uses Black’s premiums in the comparison of purchasing feeder 
cattle options to other backgrounding risk management strategies.  Black’s formula is 
derived from Black and Schoales formula for pricing stock options and relies mainly on 
the volatility (or implied volatility) of futures market prices, risk free interest rates, and 
the current price of the futures contract.  In the interest of brevity, Black’s formula will 
not be reported here.  Leuthold, Junkus, and Cordier present a complete explanation of 
Black’s formula along with examples.  For the aforementioned example, Black’s 
premium (PREMb) will equal $5.16 / cwt.  Several examples of actuarially fair premiums 
and premiums calculated using Black’s method are presented in Table 4.2 to illustrate the 
effects of volatility and interest rates on the cost of price insurance. 
At this point the price distribution for PRM can be specified by: 
(4.8)     ni +  IPi – PREM "i, 
where PREM = PREMf for an actuarially fair premium and PREM = PREMb for Black’s 
theoretical premium. 
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 The second risk management strategy is a subsidized price risk management 
program.  Specifically, this program will represent government subsidized price 
insurance and will be referred to as SubPRM.  This insurance will maintain the form of 
the European put option but producers will receive a subsidy (SUB) from the government 
that is a certain percentage of the premium.  Thus the distribution for SubPRM becomes 
(4.9)     ni +  IPi – PREM + SUB*PREM, "i, 
where PREM can represent either PREMf or PREMb In this study SUB = 50% resulting 
in an out-of-pocket expense for SubPRM of $1.01 / cwt when PREM = PREMf and $2.58 
for PREM = PREMb.  It should be noted that this subsidy level was chosen simply to 
illustrate the effects of a government subsidy.  Subsidies on crop insurance premiums are 
limited to 59% while the Dairy Options Pilot Program subsidizes 80% of dairy option 
premiums.  Based on these programs, subsidies on livestock insurance premiums could 
fall anywhere in the 59% to 80% range.  The descriptive statistics for all three 
alternatives are reported in Table 4.1 and the CDF of each is shown in Figure 1.  With the 
three choices clearly laid out, it is now possible to simulate producers’ acceptance of the 
alternatives by ranking the choices E-V and SD criteria. 
 
Ranking the Risky Alternatives 
The ranking of  NoIns, PRM, and SubPRM will be accomplished in a two-step 
process.  First, only the choices of NoIns and PRM will be available to producers.  Under 
this scenario there are no government incentives that subsidize risk management.  A 
producer must choose to be fully exposed to market risk or attempt to manage that risk at 
some cost determined by the futures market. 
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The second scenario will compare NoIns with SubPRM.  With government 
subsidies in place, PRM would still be a feasible alternative.  However, no rational 
decision maker would choose PRM.  This is because SubPRM dominates PRM under the 
E-V framework for all values of F, since the variance of prices under each alternative is 
the same but the expected price of SubPRM is greater.  Furthermore, PRM is dominated 
by SubPRM in the sense of FSD.  This makes it unnecessary to evaluate the two using 
SSD or SDRF since the results will hold (Robison and Barry).  In other words, for the 
second scenario anyone wishing to manage marketing risk would always choose 
SubPRM over PRM and anyone wishing to take on that risk would always choose NoIns, 
therefore PRM is never in the risk efficient set.  This procedure will be used first 
assuming actuarially fair options and insurance and subsequently assuming Black’s 
theoretical premium for each.  The results of this ranking are presented and discussed in 
the following section. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Scenarios 1 and 2 (NoIns vs. PRM and NoIns vs. SubPRM, respectively) were 
analyzed using E-V and SDRF.  Computer software developed by Cochran and Raskin 
was used to rank choices by SDRF.  This software has previously been used to rank risky 
alternatives relating to both feeder cattle marketing (Harrison et al.) and crop insurance 
programs (Williams et al.).  Goh et al. offer a complete description of the software. 
In scenario 1, under both E-V and SDRF, producers who have any level of risk 
aversion will choose PRM when the options are actuarially fair.  Risk neutral producers 
would be indifferent between NoIns and PRM.  However, since the decrease in variance 
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comes at no decrease in expected price, it is reasonable to assume that risk neutral 
producers would purchase the fairly priced options.  Based on these results, producers 
who maximize utility based on income realized at least 50% of the time choose PRM.  
This comes as no surprise since the actuarially fair options decrease volatility without 
decreasing expected price.  Only risk preferring producers (i.e., F < 0) would not 
purchase the options since paying a premium eliminates some positive price risk 
associated with selling feeder cattle.  When options are priced using Black’s method, a 
narrower range of risk attitudes prefer PRM to NoIns.  This result is also expected since 
Black’s premium decreases the expected price along with volatility.  In this case, 
producers evaluate this tradeoff according to their level of risk aversion.  The results of 
this comparison are reported in Table 4.3.  The next step in the analysis is to evaluate the 
effects of a government subsidized insurance in the form of European put options. 
 An anticipated effect of a subsidy on the purchase of insurance is that individuals 
who previously received no marginal benefit from the managing the risk of their 
respective operations now realize a benefit and therefore purchase insurance.  This result 
is demonstrated across both methods of risk analysis as well as both methods of option 
pricing.  For subsidized insurance based upon actuarially fair options, SDRF indicates 
that a greater amount of producers (relative to E-V) who would not choose PRM in 
scenario 1 choose SubPRM in the second scenario.  This difference in the two techniques 
is shown in Table 4.3.  These differences are due to the fact that SDRF bases decisions on 
the entire distribution of each alternative while E-V relies solely on the first two moments 
of the distribution.  SDRF recognizes, to some degree, that primarily downside risk is 
being foregone and therefore even individuals with only a slight aversion to risk would be 
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better off utilizing PRM.  E-V merely recognizes that the variance has decreased at the 
expense of a decreased expected price and judges the tradeoff accordingly with no regard 
to the type of risk that has been mitigated.  It should be noted that when premiums are 
actuarially fair, both E-V and SDRF show that some risk-preferring individuals would 
actually purchase the price insurance when premiums are subsidized.  Under both 
techniques, these are individuals who prefer more risk to less because they are willing to 
weather the volatility of a marketing strategy due to the chance of large payoffs at times. 
Relative to actuarially fair premiums, subsidized insurance based upon Black’s 
theoretical premiums is not the risk dominant choice for as many risk attitudes.  This is to 
be expected since Black’s premium offers roughly the same benefit at a higher cost.  This 
is a useful comparison since Black’s premiums more accurately reflect actual option 
premiums faced by producers.  Therefore willingness to purchase PRM and SubPRM at 
Black’s premium should more accurately describe willingness to buy real world options 
and subsidized insurance.  As mentioned earlier, it is possible to calculate this willingness 
to pay for both PRM and SubPRM. 
The E-V approach calculates an individual’s CE (or risk-adjusted returns) for a 
given situation.  Given this CE it is possible to approximate the willingness to pay by 
producers of different risk attitudes for PRM and SubPRM.  It should also be noted that 
this willingness to pay assumes that PRM and SubPRM are the only marketing strategies 
available to livestock producers and that they are mutually exclusive.  This does not 
drastically limit the discussion as this study looks to identify broad trends in the effects of 
subsidized livestock price insurance on risk faced by producers. 
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Willingness to pay for PRM and SubPRM can be determined by comparing the 
CE of NoIns with that of PRM and SubPRM, respectively, assuming that PRM and 
SubPRM were free.  That is, equations 4.8 and 4.9 were modified to leave out the 
(PREM) term.  The CE of NoIns was then subtracted from each.  The result is the 
maximum premium that a person of each risk attitude would forgo to utilize the risk 
management strategy.  These measures of willingness to pay are shown in Table 4.4.  
Willingness to pay for PRM is the same under actuarially fair premiums and Black’s 
premiums.  Introducing a subsidy obviously changes the willingness to pay for these risk 
management products.  As expected, for both actuarially fair premiums and Black’s 
premium, the CE (and therefore willingness to pay) increases by the amount of the 
subsidy.  Since Black’s premium is larger and the subsidy is based on a percentage of the 
premium, willingness to pay for SubPRM is always greater using Black’s premium. 
Once the subsidy is introduced, under either premium calculation method, a 
producer can now realize the same expected price variance as with PRM but now realize 
a higher expected price.  This means that SubPRM actually has a lower absolute volatility 
(C.V.) than PRM (see Table 4.1).  All individuals who did not wish to purchase PRM and 
for whom this increase in CE results in a willingness to pay that is greater than PREM 
will now purchase SubPRM.  It is also true that any individual whose CE is greater than 
PREM in scenario 1 would choose to purchase PRM.  E-V analysis allows these changes 
in willingness to pay to be examined for all levels of risk aversion. 
The case of the risk aversion level of 47.5% assuming an actuarially fair premium 
provides an interesting example of how the marginal benefit that comes from managing 
risk is affected by the subsidy.  In scenario 1, an individual with risk preference level of 
  77 
47.5% would be willing to pay only $1.36 / cwt for PRM and if forced to pay PREM for 
PRM would realize a marginal benefit of -$0.66 / cwt (willingness to pay – PREM).  
Under Scenario 2 the same individual is willing to pay PREM for SubPRM and receives 
a marginal benefit ($0.35 / cwt) from doing so.  The same scenario exists for the risk 
aversion levels of 52.5% to 62.5% assuming Black’s premium.  It is important to note 
that no risk-preferring individuals are persuaded by the subsidy to purchase subsidized 
insurance under Black’s premium. 
In the presence of greater price volatility, risk management results differ from 
those reported previously.  For example, if a futures price volatility of 18.14% is used to 
simulate the marketing alternatives, Black’s premium will be $7.19 (see Table 4.2) the 
subsidy will result in risk neutral producers purchasing subsidized insurance.  The 
subsidy of $3.60 would be greater than 11.11% volatility since it is based upon a 
percentage of the premium.  In fact, in this scenario, the expected feeder cattle price with 
subsidized insurance is greater than with no price protection and the volatility is lower.  
Therefore it is unambiguous that all risk neutral and risk averse producers prefer to 
purchase subsidized insurance.  Consequently, this implies that subsidized insurance 
dominates no price protection in the sense of SSD.  It should be noted that if the subsidy 
were increased by at least 10%, E-V results also indicate risk preferring individuals 
would actually be persuaded to purchase subsidized insurance that is based upon 
theoretically correct options.  Furthermore, under an 80% subsidy (the level of the Dairy 
Options Pilot Program) some risk preferring individuals (all those with a risk aversion 
level of 40% or greater) would purchase subsidized insurance.  Other results from this 
level of volatility are not reported but are available upon request from the authors.  For 
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the riskier situation, the subsidy is greater.  This indicates that, as long as the subsidy is 
based on a percentage of the premium, producers facing a more volatile expected price 
will receive a greater benefit from the subsidy. 
 These results show, as anticipated, that offering a subsidized insurance product 
could very well effect the decision-making process of certain producers, depending upon 
their risk attitude.  In general the subsidy obviously makes SubPRM more attractive than 
PRM to all producers.  However, for many producers, the difference is enough to actually 
change their optimal risk management strategy from doing nothing to purchasing price 
insurance. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 Livestock producers, like all agricultural decision makers, will choose production 
and marketing practices that maximize utility.  The feasible production and marketing 
practices will generally have some level of uncertainty associated with them.  How an 
individual evaluates these feasible alternatives to maximize utility is a function, in part, 
of his or her attitude toward risk (Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker; Boisvert and McCarl; 
Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson; Robison and Barry).  This study focused on marketing 
risk and basically ignored production risk (and all other sources of risk) during the 
analysis.  In the case of a backgrounder looking to sell feeder cattle in roughly 5 months, 
the marketing risk or uncertainty is the feeder cattle price fluctuation over that 5 months.  
In the real world, producers can purchase European options to establish a price floor thus 
mitigating the downside feeder cattle price fluctuations.  This study introduced this 
marketing alternative (with premiums calculated actuarially and using Black’s method) 
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along with the alternative of not managing price risk in Scenario 1.  Next, in Scenario 2, 
subsidized insurance, in the form of subsidized European options (once again, with 
premiums calculated actuarially and using Black’s method) was offered along with the do 
nothing strategy as alternatives.  For both scenarios the optimal choice for a variety of 
risk aversion levels was chosen using E-V analysis and SDRF.  The differences in the 
two scenarios were interesting and highlighted the effects of a subsidy on the risk faced 
by livestock producers. 
In Scenario 2, when subsidies were based upon actuarially fair premiums, a wider 
range risk attitudes, including some risk preferring individuals, found price risk 
management appealing.  This was true for both ranking techniques.  E-V results show 
that the marginal benefit producers realize from managing price risk is increased by the 
amount of the subsidy.  This translates into an increased willingness to pay for subsidized 
insurance compared to fairly priced options (see Table 4.4).  This trend was also observed 
in the realistic case involving premiums calculated using Black’s method.  Furthermore, 
as feeder cattle price volatility increased, the effects of the subsidy increased in terms of 
persuading individuals who previously did not manage risk to do so.  These results 
should be of concern to policy makers.  If individuals who have an inherent desire to seek 
risk (i.e., F < 0) now realize a positive marginal benefit from purchasing insurance, it is 
conceivable that they will use this benefit to finance operation expansions or new 
ventures that require taking on additional risk.  This practice can result in producers 
bearing as much or more risk as they did before the subsidy was introduced.  
Furthermore, the very presence of this subsidy as rent to be collected by livestock 
producers can change the structure of livestock production.  If rational decision makers 
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realize that this rent is available to them only if they produce livestock, then livestock 
production may then become a desirable (possibly optimal) method of earning income.  If 
producers are attracted only by this rent, they may or may not have the management skills 
to run a livestock operation.  In these cases subsidies could go to fund livestock price risk 
management that is being used in lieu of sound management practices. 
 These are only some of the possible general effects of subsidized livestock 
insurance.  It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to quantify production 
responses to subsidized insurance.  However, by using proven and accepted tools for 
evaluating risky decision making and by observing past instances in the crop sector, as 
this paper has done, it is possible to form hypotheses concerning the possible changes in 
beef production brought about by subsidized price insurance.  This study presents two 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Beef prices could remain at depressed levels for abnormally long time 
periods if subsidized price insurance is available to beef producers. 
Hypothesis 2:  Some level of beef production would take place that would not exist 
without subsidized price insurance for livestock. 
 
Economic theory combined with results of this analysis can be used to justify 
these hypotheses.  If the additional benefits realized due to the subsidy are used to invest 
in increasing feeder cattle production, there are likely to be noticeable changes in beef 
cattle production.  For example, when market prices for beef are low enough, a decrease 
in the quantity of finished cattle (cattle ready for slaughter) occurs.  This results in a 
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decreased demand for feeder cattle by feedlots which translates into lower feeder cattle 
prices.  In this case the backgrounders examined in this study would now be willing to 
pay less than before for weaned calves.  As a response to this, cow-calf producers are 
likely to liquidate herds to some degree and decrease calf production.  Unless there is a 
change in consumer demand for beef, this decrease in production by the entire sector is 
eventually realized at the slaughter level and prices begin to recover.  While this cycle is 
less defined in recent years, it can still be observed in beef production. 
With subsidies on price insurance in place, backgrounders (and other levels of 
productions) would now be responding to signals that are based on receiving this subsidy, 
in addition to market signals.  They might find that there is no reason to cut back 
production so quickly when prices are declining since they are guaranteed the subsidy in 
addition to a price floor.  If feeder cattle production was kept at higher levels than the 
market would normally support there would be more finished cattle and, subsequently, 
more beef than the market demands.  This excess supply could serve to keep beef prices 
and cattle prices at other levels of production low for prolonged periods of time.  
Simultaneously, production would be at abnormally high levels.  Furthermore, individual 
livestock producers might utilize riskier management and/or production strategies given 
their expectations of receiving the subsidy. Taxpayer dollars in the form of subsidies 
would be financing livestock production that, otherwise, would not be taking place. 
As stated earlier, these hypotheses cannot be tested as of yet.  However, the tools 
used to identify and explain the general trends in supply response are well established and 
accepted methods of analyzing risk.  Given this and that the hypotheses drawn here can 
be rationalized using basic economic theory, they warrant a reasonable level of 
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consideration.  The results of this study and the hypotheses offered in this section should 
serve to give some perspective to the structuring of these livestock insurance policies and 
provide a focus for future research in this subject area. 
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Table 4.1.  Descriptive Statistics of Three Price Distributions of Feeder Cattle 
Marketing Alternatives 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation C.V. 
 ($ / cwt) ($ / cwt) (%) 
 
No Price Risk 
Management 88.50 9.843 11.11 
 
Actuarially Fair 
European Put Options  88.50 7.396 8.38 
 
Subsidized Insurance Based on 
Actuarially Fair Premiums1  89.51 7.396 8.26 
 
European Put Options 
Priced via Black’s Method2 85.29 7.396 8.67 
 
Subsidized Insurance Based on 
Black’s Premiums1,2 87.90 7.396 8.41 
 
1.  The subsidy equals 50% of the option premium. 
2.  Premiums were calculated Black’s formula for theoretical futures option premiums assuming a current 
futures price of $88.50, 11.11% volatility, 4 % risk free interest rate, and 150 days to maturity. 
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Table 4.2.  Actuarially Fair Premiums and Black’s Theoretical Premiums for 
European Put Options for Feeder Cattle 
Risk Free Volatility Actuarially Fair Black’s Theoretical 
Interest Rate of Futures Prices Premium Premium 
(%) (%) ($ / cwt) ($ / cwt) 
 
4.0 11.11 2.02 5.23 
 15.14 3.31 6.40 
 18.17 4.29 7.19 
 
6.0 11.11 2.02 5.16 
 15.14 3.31 6.33 
 18.17 4.29 7.11 
 
8.0 11.11 2.02 5.09 
 15.14 3.31 6.25 
 18.17 4.29 7.03 
Note:  Current futures price is assumed to be $88.50 per cwt.  The strike price is $84.07 / cwt and the 
option is assumed to expire in 150 days. 
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Table 4.3.  Ranges of Risk Aversion Levels for Which Each Marketing Alternative is 
Preferred to No Price Risk Management Under Expected Value Variance (E-V) or 
Stochastic Dominance (SDRF) Analysis 
 Range of Risk Range of Risk 
 Aversion Levels1  Aversion Coefficients1 
 
Actuarially Fair 
European Put Options 
 E-V 50.0% and greater 0.0 and greater 
 SDRF 50.0% and greater 0.0 and greater 
 
Subsidized Insurance Based on 
Actuarially Fair Premiums 
 E-V 47.5% and greater -0.01780 and greater 
 SDRF 40.0% and greater -0.05145 and greater 
 
European Put Options 
Priced via Black’s Method2 
 E-V 65.0% and greater 0.07830 and greater 
 SDRF 72.5% and greater 0.12202 and greater 
 
Subsidized Insurance Based on 
Black’s Premiums2 
 E-V 52.5% and greater 0.01780 and greater 
 SDRF 55.0% and greater 0.02562 and greater 
 
1.  Risk aversion coefficients were calculated via the procedure offered by McCarl and Bessler.  A brief 
explanation of the interpretation of this coefficient is presented in the text of this paper.  See McCarl and 
Bessler for a detailed presentation. 
2.  Premiums were calculated Black’s formula for theoretical futures option premiums assuming a current 
futures price of $88.50, 11.11% volatility, 4.0 % risk free interest rate, and 150 days to maturity. 
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Table 4.4.  Willingness to Pay for European Put Options 
 
Risk Aversion Risk Aversion European Put Options 
Level1 Coefficient1   
  ($ / cwt) 
 
5% -0.33455 -12.03 
30% -0.10657 -2.46 
40% -0.05145 -0.14 
42.5% -0.03864 0.40 
45% -0.02562 0.95 
47.5% -0.01780 1.27 
50% 0.0 2.02 
52.5% 0.01780 2.77 
55% 0.02562 3.10 
57.5 0.03864 3.65 
60% 0.05145 4.18 
62.5% 0.06508 4.76 
65% 0.07830 5.31 
67.5 0.09231 5.90 
70% 0.10657 6.50 
72.5% 0.12202 7.15 
75% 0.13728 7.79 
77.5% 0.15361 8.48 
87.5% 0.23388 11.85 
95% 0.33455 16.08 
 
1.  Risk aversion coefficients were calculated via the procedure offered by McCarl and Bessler.  A brief 
explanation of the interpretation of this coefficient is presented in the text of this paper.  See McCarl and 
Bessler for a detailed presentation. 
 
Note:  Willingness to pay represents the amount that the risk-adjusted return per cwt is changed when 
European put options are purchased.  To determine whether a decision maker of a given risk aversion level 
would purchase these options or subsidized insurance this willingness to pay can be compared to $2.02, 
$1.01, $5.23, and $2.62 for actuarially fair premiums, subsidized actuarially fair insurance, options priced 
via Black’s method, and subsidized Black’s premium.  Black’s formula assumed 11.11% volatility, 4.0% 
risk free interest rate, and 150 days to maturity.  In all cases the subsidy used was equal to 50% of the 
relevant premium.   
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Figure 4.1.  Cumulative Distribution Functions of Feeder Cattle Marketing 
Alternatives 
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Note:  The distribution of No Price Protection is based on an expected price of $88.50 / cwt with a volatility 
of 11.11% distributions of Fully Priced Options and Subsidized Insurance are based on actuarially fair 
premiums and a 50% subsidy of that premium, respectively. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Summary of Risk Analyses 
Beef producers, like all farmers, must make decisions such as input selection and 
how to market output in an uncertain environment.  Backgrounders in particular must 
purchase feed ingredients and weaned calves with the intention of feeding the calves and 
selling them as feeder cattle in a few months.  The net income risk of a backgrounding 
operation is drastically influenced by the risks surrounding the purchase of feed 
ingredients and the sale of feeder cattle.  Backgrounders who are risk averse would prefer 
to forgo some amount of expected net income to realize a more predictable net income.  
The amount of net income that a producer will forgo in exchange for a decrease in 
volatility of net income is dependent upon his or her level of risk aversion.  While 
strategies exist for risk averse producers to manage net income risk, there are other 
potentially effective strategies that have gone relatively unexplored.  This study 
introduced and evaluated two such novel risk management strategies.  These strategies 
are aimed at managing net income risk by managing risks associated with purchasing 
feed ingredients and selling feeder cattle, respectively.  A summary of the analysis 
regarding each of these strategies follows. 
 
Summary of Optimal Feed Ration Determination 
Given the impact of feed cost on total livestock production expense the 
determination of a feed ration warrants careful consideration by livestock producers.  A 
common approach to this determination is identifying the minimum cost combination of 
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available feed ingredients that satisfy nutritional requirements using linear programming.  
Linear programming models that select minimum cost feed rations have had a 
pronounced presence in academic research and are prevalent as applied decision tools.  
Although useful, these models have generally ignored the risks associated with 
purchasing feed ingredients, of which feed ingredient nutrient variability and price risk 
are the most critical.  Therefore, it is worthwhile to expand the traditional model to 
choose optimal rations considering variability in the nutritional compositions and price 
variability of feed ingredients. 
The traditional model was expanded in Chapter III to consider nutrient variability 
and price risk.  This expansion included introducing a Merrill’s technique for modeling 
technical coefficient uncertainty and an E-V framework to consider objective function 
risk.  There were both methodological and applied contributions to agricultural economic 
research resulting from this expansion. 
Chapter III contributed to the mathematical programming literature by explicitly 
modeling the problematic issue of technical coefficient risk using Merrill’s approach.  
Due to limitations of computational solvers, Merrill’s approach is absent from the 
literature with the exception of one study in which Wicks and Guise utilized a linear 
approximation of the technique.  Given the advancement of computational solvers for 
optimization and the recent availability of reliable feed ingredient nutrient variability 
data, this study was able to model Merrill’s approach directly. 
A contribution to applied livestock economic literature was the demonstration that 
minimum cost feed rations are not optimal to all producers.  This implies that if a risk 
averse producer chooses rations using traditional linear programming decision aids, he or 
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she is exposed to more risk than would be preferred.  The expanded model allows 
decision makers to select rations that are optimal subject to their aversion to nutrient 
variability and/or price risk.  Model results indicate that, in many cases, producers 
wishing to control the variability of nutrients in the ration need only to increase the 
amounts of the optimal ingredients.  The magnitude of this increase will vary depending 
on which ingredients are in the optimal ration with no consideration given to risk.  
Controlling price risk usually requires bringing new ingredients into the optimal ration or 
changing the relative amounts of the ingredients in the base ration.  Managing the two 
types of risk simultaneously requires more complex combinations of the two strategies 
listed above.  These results and basic methods of managing nutrient and price risks could 
be the basis for more advanced decision tools.  These decision tools can present 
alternative rations in the form of a set of risk efficient choices as was done in this study.  
Decision makers can then weigh the costs and benefits of all feasible alternatives and 
then formulate rations that are optimal given their individual attitude toward risk. 
 
Summary of Subsidized Livestock Insurance Analysis Summary 
Chapter IV focused on marketing risk of a backgrounder who anticipates selling 
of feeder cattle five months in the future.  This marketing risk is the feeder cattle price 
fluctuation over that five months.  Producers can currently purchase European options to 
establish a price floor thus mitigating the impact of downside feeder cattle price 
fluctuations.  This study compared this marketing alternative (with premiums calculated 
actuarially and using Black’s method) to the alternative of not managing price risk.  Next, 
subsidized insurance, in the form of subsidized European options (once again, with 
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premiums calculated actuarially and using Black’s method) was compared to the do 
nothing strategy.  In both comparisons, the optimal choice for a variety of risk aversion 
levels was chosen using E-V analysis and SDRF. 
 When subsidized insurance was based upon actuarially fair premiums, a wider 
range of risk attitudes, including risk preferring individuals, found price risk management 
appealing.  This was true for both ranking techniques.  When premiums were calculated 
using Black’s method fewer individuals found price risk management appealing, relative 
to actuarially fair premiums, and no risk-preferring individuals were compelled to 
purchase insurance at a 50% subsidy.  However, as either volatility of feeder cattle prices 
or subsidy level increased, risk preferring individuals were indeed persuaded to purchase 
insurance under Black’s premiums.  It is evident how these results could be of concern to 
policy makers. 
If individuals who have an inherent desire to seek risk now realize a positive 
marginal benefit from purchasing insurance, it is conceivable that they will use this as 
means to finance the taking on of additional risk.  This practice can result in producers 
bearing as much or more risk as they did before the subsidy was introduced.  
Furthermore, the very presence of this subsidy as rent to be collected by livestock 
producers can change the structure of livestock production.  If rational decision makers 
realize that this rent is available to them only if they produce livestock, then livestock 
production may then become a desirable (possibly optimal) method of earning income.  If 
producers are attracted only by this rent, they may or may not have the management skills 
to run a livestock operation.  In these cases subsidies could go to fund livestock price risk 
management that is being used in lieu of sound management practices. 
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 Chapter IV evaluated these results to form two hypotheses of the potential effects 
of subsidized livestock insurance on beef production.  These are: 
  
Hypothesis 1:  Beef prices could remain at depressed levels for abnormally long time 
periods if subsidized price insurance is available to beef producers. 
Hypothesis 2:  Some level of beef production will take place that would not exist without 
subsidized price insurance for livestock. 
 
While not testable at this point, the hypotheses drawn here can be rationalized 
using basic economic theory.  Therefore, they warrant a reasonable level of consideration 
in the structuring of livestock insurance products as well as future livestock economic 
research.  Hopefully the results and the hypotheses offered in Chapter IV will encourage 
policy makers to consider the incentives that subsidized livestock insurance actually 
introduces to producers and subsequently look to introduce appropriate incentives. 
 
Risk Management Contributions  
As previously stated, the general objective of this study was to introduce and 
evaluate novel risk management strategies for beef producers.  While risk management in 
agriculture has been a widely researched area, the strategies presented in this study have 
gone largely unexplored.  There have been various reasons, as discussed throughout this 
study, for the absence of the analysis of these strategies.  However, at this juncture it is 
entirely feasible and worthwhile to examine the risk management potential of selecting 
optimal feed rations (as opposed to strictly minimum cost feed rations) and subsidized 
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livestock insurance.  The analysis of each strategy in this study can serve to focus future 
research in livestock risk management. 
The model for selecting optimal feed rations can be applied to other types of 
livestock producers such as dairies or feedlots.  The model in Chapter III can be readily 
changed to formulate rations for any group of animals for which nutrient requirements 
are known.  However specification of such models may be limited by feed ingredient 
data.  The nutrient variability data in Chapter III represents perhaps the best available 
data of that type.  It is often difficult to obtain such data for certain feed ingredient or for 
specific states or regions of the country. 
While basic in terms of the methods and data used, the analysis of subsidized 
insurance should offer some perspective of how useful this will be as a risk management 
tool.  This aspect of the analysis will soon be of interest to livestock producers as 
livestock insurance products become available.  Regardless of the form these products 
take, the analytical framework in Chapter IV will be applicable to their comparison with 
each other and other risk management strategies.  Furthermore, the analysis of subsidized 
livestock insurance highlights policy concerns of making such a risk management tool 
available to producers.  Specifically, the results show that such products can easily 
introduce unintentional incentives to producers.  Chapter IV should serve as a basic 
example of the effects of risk management and its subsidization that can be modified to 
examine these issues in almost any context. 
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Conclusions 
Given the importance of beef to the United States’ agricultural economy and the 
trend of a decreasing government role in agricultural risk management, a major role of 
livestock economists is to evaluate possible alternatives for improving beef producers’ 
ability to manage risk.  This study has performed this evaluation for two such 
alternatives, minimum cost feed ration selection and subsidized livestock insurance, as 
they apply to a beef backgrounder.  Certain results of this study are useful only to beef 
backgrounders.  However, some results have a much broader application.  Feed 
manufacturers may also have a desire to purchase ingredients that result in a more 
predictable nutrient composition.  Agricultural lenders would benefit from knowing the 
effectiveness of livestock insurance as a risk management tool, as they evaluate livestock 
producers’ qualifications for credit.  In addition to these applied uses of the results, the 
analytical frameworks and overall conclusions can benefit a broad range of individuals. 
Successful introduction of Merrill’s technique into a mathematical programming 
model paves the way for expanded research into the effects of technical coefficient risk.  
Applying widely accepting methods to the evaluation of subsidized livestock insurance 
offers a basic framework for analyzing price variability and the effects of a government 
subsidy that is widely applicable.  In general, the results discussed and conclusions 
offered by this study coupled with the questions raised by it should serve to improve the 
agricultural producers’ understanding of risk in agricultural decision making. 
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